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REJECTING THE CHILDREN OF VIOLENCE:
WHY U.S. ASYLUM LAW SHOULD RETURN TO




In recent years, in reaction to increasing numbers of children arriving at
the U.S. border fleeing gangs in Central America, the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) and U.S. courts have improperly narrowed the definition of "a
particular social group," one of the protected grounds for asylum. Instead of
relying on the widely accepted and longstanding immutable characteristics
formulation set out in Matter of Acosta, the BIA inexplicably added new
requirements of social distinction and particularity. These new requirements
are devastating to the asylum claims of children fleeing forced recruitment
from gangs in Central America. In most of these cases, the BIA and the courts
have found these children are not members of a particular social group
deserving protection in the form of asylum. This narrower definition of a
particular social group will also affect children to whom the U.S. and
international community is much more sympathetic, such as child soldiers.
This article argues that U.S. asylum law should return to the Acosta
formulation of a particular social group, and that the social distinction and
particularity requirements should only be an alternative formulation of a
particular social group, not additional requirements.
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insightful comments on this article. I am also indebted to the scholars who participated in the 2015
Emerging Immigration Scholars conference and to the faculty of Michigan State University Law
School, including professor David Thronson, who provided feedback on an early draft of this article
during a junior faculty exchange. Finally, I could not have written this article without the excellent
research assistance of Natalia Vieira-Santanna, Megan O'Neil, and Shahar Ben-Josef. The opinions
and characterizations in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent official
positions of the United States Government, for whom the author previously worked. © 2016, Rachel
Gonzalez Settlage.
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INTRODUCTION
There are thousands of child soldiers in more than twenty countries around
the world.' Many of these children are forcibly recruited to be soldiers in
government or rebel armed forces. During recruitment and after children
become soldiers, the armed forces subject these children to horrific abuses to
manipulate and control them.2 Ishmael Beah was twelve years old when
rebels attacked his village in Sierra Leone, killing his family. He was able to
escape with other boys and wandered from village to village until the Sierra
Leone army found him and forced him to join the military or be turned out
into rebel territory. The military taught him to use a gun, put him on the front
lines of the civil war, and gave him drugs, including marijuana and a mixture
of cocaine and gunpowder, to control him. He was lucky; the military
eventually turned him over to a UNICEF rehabilitation center.3
1. See Press Release, United Nations Children's Rights & Emergency Relief Org. (UNICEF),
More brutal and intense conflicts leave children increasingly at risk of recruitment, U.N. Press
Release (Feb. 12, 2015) [hereinafter UNICEF Press Release].
2. See infra Section III.A.
3. ISHMAEL BEAH, ALONG WAY GONE, MEMOIRS OFA BOY SOLDIER (2008).
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There are also thousands of children forcibly recruited into gang member-
ship in countries throughout Central America.4 As with child soldiers, gangs
subject these children to terrible abuses both during recruitment and once
they become gang members.5 When Jose Urbina-Mejia was fourteen years
old, the 18th Street gang in Honduras informed him at a school party that he
must join their gang, and that night forced him to join by beating him. Gang
members told him that he would be killed if he did not do as he was told. He
was forced to accompany other gang members as they robbed and sometimes
beat people. A gang leader taught him to use a gun for protection from the
rival gang, MS- 13, a member of which once shot Jose in the foot. During his
asylum hearing in the United States, Jose testified that he regretted his
activities in the gang but was afraid "that he would be killed if he did not
participate."
6
Some of the children fleeing gangs or armed forces, like Jose, are able to
escape and make their way to the United States, where they ask for protection
in the form of asylum.7 In order to qualify for asylum in the United States, a
child must demonstrate that he meets the definition of a refugee.8 The child
must prove that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in his home
country on account of his race, religion, nationality, political opinion or
membership in a particular social group.9 Thus, it is not enough that the child
fears persecution if returned to his home country; the persecution feared by
the child must also be on account of a protected ground.l1 In most cases
involving the forced recruitment of a child, the only basis upon which a child
can claim a well-founded fear of persecution is his membership in a
particular social group.1 Thus, meeting the definition of a particular social
group is a critical threshold issue in the asylum claims of children fleeing
forced recruitment.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),1 2 in Matter of Acosta, defined a
particular social group as a "group of persons[,] all of whom share a
4. See, e.g., CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. GANGS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 6
(2014); ELIZABETH KENNEDY, AM. IMMGR. COUNCIL, No CHILDHOOD HERE: WHY CENTRAL AMERICAN
CHILDREN ARE FLEEING THEIR HOMES 2 (2014).
5. See infra Section III.B.
6. Urbina-Meija v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 362-63 (6th Cir. 2010).
7. The United States is obligated under the UN Refugee Convention to provide protection to
those who face persecution in their home countries. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]; Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]
(together the UN Refugee Convention).
8. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2004); 8 U.S.C.A. §1101(a)(42)(A) (2014).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See infra Section III.B.
12. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is the highest administrative appellate body in the
Executive Office for Immigration Review in the Department of Justice. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Board
of Immigration Appeals, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2014).
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common, immutable characteristic." 1 3 This standard served as the governing
definition of a particular social group for several decades. However, case law
regarding children fleeing forced recruitment as a particular social group was
greatly underdeveloped under the Acosta formulation. 1 4 This changed in the
late 2000s when the BIA and courts faced an increasing number of gang-
based asylum claims. 15 In the context of these gang-based cases, the BIA
improperly narrowed the definition of a particular social group. 16 Now, a
proposed social group must be composed not only of individuals who share a
common immutable characteristic but the group must also be both "particu-
lar" and "socially distinct." 17
The new standard has been devastating to the asylum claims of children
who are targeted for forced recruitment. Under the new standard, the BIA and
most of the circuit courts have found that these children are not members of a
particular social group. The reasoning is that the social groups proposed in
these cases-groups that often combine the characteristics of age, gender,
country of origin, or some other feature-fail either the "social distinction"
or "particularity" requirements.8 By declining to recognize in most cases
that a protected ground exists for children fearing recruitment by armed
forces or gang membership, the BIA and the courts have made it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for these children to qualify for asylum. As a
result, these children face being returned to their home countries and the
horrors of forced recruitment.
To understand why the law has developed in this way, it is helpful to look
at the narrative pertaining to children fleeing gangs in Central America,
where most gang-related asylum claims originate. 9 The media often portrays
children fleeing gangs, whether former gang members or not, as economic
migrants at best.20 At worst, these children face accusations of being violent
juvenile delinquents who are complicit in their recruitment and pose a danger
13. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
14. See infra Section IV.B.1.
15. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, DIV. OF INT'L PROT., GUIDANCE NOTE ON
REFUGEE CLAIMS RELATED TO VICTIMS OF ORGANIZED GANGS 1 (March 2010) [hereinafter UNHCR
GUIDANCE ON GANGS].
16. See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 579
(B.I.A. 2008); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. 227, 231 (B.I.A. 2014).
17. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 227, 231.
18. See infra Section IV.B.2.
19. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children
Statistics Fiscal Year 2016, http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-
children/fy-2016 (last visited Dec. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Southwest Border Unaccompanied Children
Statistics].
20. See, e.g., Brianna Lee, Are Central American Children Crossing US Border Refugees Or
Economic Migrants?, INT'L BUS. TIMES (July 10, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/are-central-american-
children-crossing-us-border-refugees-or-economic-migrants- 1623782; Stephanie L. Canizales, Unac-
companied Migrant Children: A Humanitarian Crisis at the U.S. Border and Beyond, 2 CTR. FOR
POVERTY RES. POL' Y BRIEF 4, available at http://poverty.ucdavis.edu/sites/main/files/file-attachments/
canizales migrant-youth-brief.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
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to American society.21 The multitude of children coming to the United States
fleeing gang violence in the last several decades, and particularly in the last
five years, has compounded this negative rhetoric.22 It was against this
backdrop of child migration from Central America, a "flood" so to speak,23
that the BIA narrowed the legal definition of a "particular social group" in the
context of gang-related claims.24 The BIA justified the narrowing of the
definition of particular social group by citing to case law and to guidelines
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
However, the fear of increasing numbers of children fleeing gang violence in
Central America seeking asylum in the United States improperly influenced
the BIA. Furthermore, the BIA incorrectly interpreted the UNHCR guide-
lines, and the new requirements for a particular social group diverge from
internationally recognized norms of protection.
The narrowing of the definition of particular social group impacts not just
children fleeing Central American gangs, but other groups of children as
well, including those fleeing forced recruitment as child soldiers. This is true
despite the fact that child soldiers, or those seeking to avoid becoming a child
soldier, have engendered sympathy and compassion from people around the
world.26 The child soldier narrative differs dramatically from the child gang
21. See, e.g., Ashley Collman and Ryan Parry, Known gang members among thousands of illegal
immigrant children storming the U.S. border and officials are now trying to silence officers from
talking to the media, DAILYMAIL.COM, (June 14, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
265 7695/Known-gang- members-thou sands-illegal-immigrant-children-storing-U-S-border-government-
trying-silence-officers-talking-media.html#ixzz3oskxOYkB; Judson Phillips, President Obama opens
U.S. borders: Children, criminals, terrorists welcome, CMTY'S. DIGITAL NEWS (June 20, 2014),
http://www.commdiginews.com/politics-2/president-obama-opens-u-s-borders-children-criminals-
terrorists-welcome- 19911/.
22. Estimates put the number of unaccompanied children who arrived from these countries in
fiscal year 2014 (Oct. 2013 to Sept. 2014) at nearly 70,000, up from approximately 16,000 in 2011.
Southwest Border Unaccompanied Children Statistics, supra note 19; see also Muzaffar Chishti &
Faye Hipsman, Unaccompanied Minors Crisis Has Receded from Headlines But Major Issues
Remain, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Sept. 25, 2014), www.migrationpolicy.org/article/unaccompanied-
minors-crisis-has-receded-headlines-major-issues-remain [hereinafter Chishti, Unaccompanied Mi-
nors]; see also Lisa Frydman & Neha Desai, Beacon of Hope or Failure of Protection? U.S.
Treatment ofAsylum Claims Based on Persecution by Organized Gangs, 12-10 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1,
3 & n.23 (Oct. 2012); Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of
Floodgates or Call to (Principled)Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 119, 132-33 (2007).
23. Carrie Kahn, A Flood Of Kids, On Their Own, Hope to Hop a Train to a New Life, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (June 10, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/06/10/320645461/a-flood-of-kids-
on-their-own-hope-to-hop-a-train-to-a-new-life; John Burnett, From a Stream to a Flood: Migrant
Kids Overwhelm U.S. Border Agents, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (June 20, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/0
6/20/32365781 7/from-a-stream-to-a-flood-migrant-kids-overwhelm-u-s-border-agents; Reuters,
Obama To Ask Congress For $2B to Deal With Flood of Immigrant Children on Border, NEWSWEEK
(June 29, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/obama-ask-congress-2-b-deal-flood-immigrant-children-
border-256605.
24. See infra Section IV.B.2.
25. See Matter of C-A-, supra note 16.
26. Timothy Webster, Babes with Arms: International Law and Child Soldiers, 39 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 227, 227 (2007) ("Barely a crime thirty years ago, the ban on recruiting children took
root in the 1990s and has since blossomed into over a dozen indictments in contemporary
international criminal courts .... the age of impunity has finally passed for those who use and recruit
child soldiers.").
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member narrative. It is one of an innocent child abducted from his home and
subjected to horrific treatment before having a gun placed in his hands and
being coerced to shoot.27 Ishmael Beah had his story made into a book that
was sold at the cash registers of Starbucks coffee shops around the United
States.
28
Interest in and compassion for child soldiers has resulted in much scholar-
ship,29 and much advocacy aimed at finding means to protect former child
soldiers and children at risk of becoming child soldiers.30 Scholars who have
addressed the issue of asylum and child soldiers have focused particularly on
overcoming persecutor and related bars to asylum for those children who
were engaged in combat or military situations.31 However, these efforts miss
the point, for even if a child fleeing forced soldier recruitment can overcome
such bars, it will be of little consequence if he cannot meet the threshold issue
of establishing that he was persecuted on the basis of a protected characteris-
tic. When the BIA, in the context of gang-based claims, improperly narrowed
the definition of a particular social group, it did so in a way that negatively
impacts the asylum claims of all children fleeing forced recruitment, includ-
ing child soldiers and gang members alike.
U.S. asylum law should return to the Acosta formulation of a particular
social group and the social distinction and particularity requirements hould
only be an alternative formulation of a particular social group, not additional
requirements. The Acosta formulation provides a clear yet flexible standard
for determining what constitutes a particular social group, a standard that is
27. Susan Tiefenbrun, Child Soldiers, Slavery and the Trafficking of Children, 31 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 415, 423-24 (2008) (describing child soldiers' journey from their home and childhood to
participation in warfare).
28. BEAH, supra note 3; see also Riveting True Story of Hope and Redemption "A Long Way
Gone" is Next Starbucks Featured Book, STARBUCKS NEWSROOM, news.starbucks.com/news/riveting-
true-story-of-hope-and-redemption-a-long-way-gone-is-next-starbuck (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
29. See, e.g., Tiefenbrun, supra note 27; Luz E. Nagle, Child Soldiers and the Duty of Nations to
Protect Children from Participation in Armed Conflict, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 1 (2011);
Matthew Happold, Excluding Children From Refugee Status: Child Soldiers and Article IF of the
Refugee Convention, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1131 (2002).
30. See, e.g., OFFICE OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SEC'Y-GEN. FOR CHILDREN AND ARMED
CONFLICT, Children, Not Soldiers, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/children-not-soldiers (last
visited Jan. 12, 2015); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Child Soldiers, https://www.hrw.org/topic/childrens-
rights/child-soldiers (last visited Mar. 11, 2015); CHILD SOLDIERS INT'L, http://www.child-soldiers.org/
(last visited Mar. 11, 2015); INVISIBLE CHILDREN, invisiblechildren.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2015).
Even Congress has sought ways to help child soldiers. For example, in 2007, during a Congressional
hearing on child soldiers in which a recurring theme of the testimony was the bars to asylum in the
United States for child soldiers, Senator Tom Coburn proposed a special immigration track for child
soldiers seeking asylum. Casualties of War: Child soldiers and the Law: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law on the S. Comm on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 23 (2007).
31. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rossi, A "Special Track" for Former Child Soldiers: Enacting a
"Child Soldier Visa" as an Alternative to Asylum Protections, 31 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 392 (2013);
Bryan Lonegan, Sinners or Saints: Child Soldiers and the Persecutor Bar to Asylum After Negusie v.
Holder, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 71 (2011); Kathryn White, A Chancefor Redemption: Revising the
"Persecutor Bar" and "Material Support Bar" in the Case of Child Soldiers, 43 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 191 (2010); RAIo G. KRISHNAYYA, CTR. FOR VICTIM & HUMAN RIGHTS, No WAY OUT:
REPRESENTING CHILD SOLDIERS IN ASYLUM CASES AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE STRICT
LIABILITY EXCLUSION UNDER THE "PERSECUTION OF OTHERS" CLAUSE (2009).
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
consistent with international law. Under the Acosta definition of a particular
social group, there was room for developing successful social groups in
asylum claims involving the forced recruitment of children. In contrast, the
BIA's new requirements of "particularity" and "social distinction" leave little
room to develop successful social group claims for these children. By
refusing to recognize that children targeted for forced recruitment, whether
by gangs or by armed forces, are members of a particular social group, the
BIA and the courts are abandoning targeted children to persecution and
torture.
Part II of this article provides a background on U.S. asylum law, in
particular the evolution of the definition of a particular social group. In Part
II, I will argue the BIA improperly narrowed the definition of a particular
social group by introducing the requirements of "social distinction" and
"particularity." I will also argue that U.S. asylum law should return to the
Acosta definition of a particular social group, and that the social distinction
and particularity requirements hould only be an alternative formulation of a
particular social group, not additional requirements. Part III of this article
provides a background on the global problem of child soldiers and children in
gangs, highlighting the similarities between the two groups, as well as the
disparate narrative they face. This section will lay the groundwork for
exploring how the negative narrative that surrounds children fleeing gangs
improperly affected a change in U.S. asylum law that will also negatively
impact child soldiers, a group to whom the U.S. community is much more
sympathetic. Part IV of this article examines particular social group analysis
with regard to children who fear recruitment as child soldiers or gang
members under both the Acosta standard and the new requirements. I will
argue that under the Acosta standard, which is the standard that should be
used in particular social group analysis, claims from children fleeing forced
recruitment are cognizable in certain circumstances.
I. U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND THE PROTECTED GROUND OF MEMBERSHIP IN A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
Asylum and refugee law is, at its core, international law.32 The United
States ratified the United Nations (UN) Refugee Convention in 1968,33 thus
indicating consent to be bound by the Convention's provisions.34 The most
32. James C. Simeon, Introduction: Searching for ways to enhance the UNHCR's capacity to
supervise international refugee law in THE UNHCRAND THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
LAW 4-5 (James C. Simeon, ed., 2013) [hereinafter UNHCR & SUPERVISION OF INT'L REFUGEE LAW].
33. The UN Refugee Convention defines a refugee and sets out the rights of refugees and the
responsibilities of State parties to refugees. 1951 Convention, supra note 7; 1967 Protocol, supra
note 7; UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the
1967 Protocol (last visited Mar. 6, 2016), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html (as of
Apr. 1, 2011).
34. UN Refugee Convention, supra note 7; see also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR
REFUGEES, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Introductory Note at 2 (2010),
[Vol. 30:287
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fundamental obligation that arises under the UN Refugee Convention is the
duty of non-refoulement: or the prohibition on returning a refugee to a
country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened.35 The UN
Refugee Convention does not outline a procedure for deciding whether or not
an individual is a refugee or deserves asylum. Rather, the courts and agencies
of each state party to the Convention interpret and administer their obliga-
tions under the Convention through the development of domestic asylum
laws and procedures.3 6 Nevertheless, when interpreting the provisions of
domestic asylum law, state party adjudicators are obligated to do so in a
manner that is consistent with the UN Refugee Convention.3 7
The United States codified the provisions of the UN Refugee Convention
in the Refugee Act of 1980.31 In order to obtain asylum in the United States,
the asylum seeker must meet the definition of a refugee.39 The primary
requirement is that the asylum seeker has a well-founded fear of persecution
if he returns to his home county.40 It is not enough that someone simply
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html; U.N., Dag Hammarskjdld Library, What is the difference
between signing, ratification and accession of UN treaties?, http://ask.un.org/faq/14594 (last visited
Aug. 13, 2015).
35. 1951 Convention, supra note 7, at art. 33(1) ("No Contracting State shall expel or return
("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.").
36. James C. Simeon, A Comparative Analysis of the Response of the UNHCR and Industrialized
States to Rapidly Fluctuating Refugee Status and Asylum Applications: Lessons and Best Practices
for RSD Systems Design and Administration, 22 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 72, 76-77 (2010) (noting that the
UNHCR promulgated a Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status to
serve as a guide for State parties; however, the Handbook has no binding authority).
37. See Brief for The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2012) available at
http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Henriquez-Rivas%20UNHCR%2Brief.
pdf ("The Refugee Act thus serves to bring the United States into compliance with its international
obligations under the 1967 Protocol, and through this Protocol the 1951 Convention, and should be
interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with those instruments.") (citing Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of Congress ought never be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains.")) [hereinafter UNHCR Brief Henriquez-
Rivas].
38. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102; Immigration & Nationality Act
§§ 101(a)(42), 208 [hereinafter INA]; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101,1158 (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 208.14.
39. The United States defines a refugee as "any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality.., and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). This definition is adapted from the UN Refugee
Convention with only minor changes. See 1951 Convention, supra note 7, at art. 1(2); 1967 Protocol,
supra note 7, at art. 1(2). Even if an asylum seeker meets the refugee definition, she still has the
"burden of establishing that the favorable exercise of discretion is warranted." Matter of Pula, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 467, 474 (B.I.A. 1987).
40. 8 C.FIR. § 208.13(b) (2014). The INA does not define persecution, and there is no generally
agreed upon definition of persecution. REGINA GERMAIN, ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 33-34 (Am. Immig. Lawyers Ass'n 2010) (citing the UNHCR
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status). The BIA defined persecution
as "a threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a
way regarded as offensive." Matter ofAcosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222. The BIA further noted that the
"harm or suffering had to be inflicted upon an individual in order to punish him for possessing a belief
296 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:287
experienced past persecution r has a well-founded fear of future persecution
in his home country. The perpetrator of the past or feared future persecution
must be a government agent or a non-governmental actor that the govern-
ment is unwilling or unable to control.4 1 In addition, the persecution must be
perpetrated "on account of' a protected ground.42 The five protected grounds
are race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular
social group.43 The asylum seeker must demonstrate that at least one central
reason for his persecutor's motivation is one of these five protected grounds.44
This nexus requirement requires that an individual face a particularized
threat. Being a random target of violence and harm, even violence or harm
that rises to the level of persecution, is not sufficient if the applicant cannot
show that the harm was inflicted on account of one of the five grounds.4 6
Although closely connected, the analysis of whether the applicant possesses
a protected characteristic is a separate analysis from the nexus analysis.4 7
Children seeking protection from forced recruitment by armed forces or
gangs must demonstrate that they meet the definition of a refugee. While
such children must meet each element of the refugee definition, they must
first demonstrate the existence of a protected ground. In most asylum cases
involving the forced recruitment of a child, the claim is based on the child's
membership in a particular social group.48 Thus, the definition under U.S.
asylum law of a particular social group is a crucial threshold issue in
or characteristic a persecutor sought to overcome." Id. at 222. However, in a later decision, Matter of
Kasinga, the BIA modified this definition to hold that a "subjective 'punitive' or 'malignant' intent is
not required for harm to constitute persecution." In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A.
1996). Many federal circuit court decisions also attempt to define "persecution." See, e.g., Mitev v.
INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995) (outlining the hallmarks of persecution as "detention, arrest,
interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance,
beatings, or torture.").
41. See RACHEL GONZALEZ SETTLAGE, ELIZABETH ANNE CAMPBELL & VERONICA TOBAR THRON-
SON, IMMIGRATION RELIEF: LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR NONCITIZEN CRIME VICTIMS 91 (Am. Bar Ass'n
Book Publishing 2014) ("Persons or groups that governments have been found to be unable or
unwilling to control have included rival clans, rebel groups, gangs, abusive partners, or tribes who
perform female genital mutilation."); see also Matter of Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A.
1990); Matter of H-, 211. & N. Dec. 337, 345 (B.I.A. 1996); In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365
(B.I.A. 1996).
42. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2014).
43. Id.
44. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i) as amended by Section 101(a) of the Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13,
119 Stat. 302; see also SETTLAGE ETAL., supra note 41, at 91.
45. Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1994); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533,
551-52 (6th Cir. 2003).
46. Courts in the United States have generally held that simply fleeing civil strife is not enough to
meet the nexus requirement. Hallman v. INS, 879 F.2d 1244, 1247 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[A]sylum is not
available to every victim of civil strife, but is restricted to those persecuted for a particular reason.").
But the existence of civil strife does not preclude a finding of particularized persecution. See Ahmed
v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1194-95, 1195 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[E]ven though generalized violence as
a result of civil strife does not necessarily qualify as persecution, neither does civil strife eliminate
the possibility of persecution.").
47. See Frydman & Desai, supra note 22, at 3, 15, n.21 (citing Ayala v. Holder, 640 F3d. 1095,
1096-98 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. 227, 231 (B.I.A. 2014).
48. See infra Section IV; see also Frydman & Desai, supra note 22, at 23-24.
REJECTING THE CHILDREN OF VIOLENCE
establishing eligibility for asylum for children fleeing forced recruitment.4 9
For more than two decades, a "particular social group" was defined as a
,.group of persons, all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic,"
as set forth in the BIA case, Matter of Acosta.5 0 The Acosta standard was
widely accepted both in the United States and internationally. 5  However, in
the face of an increasing number of gang-based asylum claims, 2 the BIA
improperly narrowed the definition of a particular social group in a way that
diverges from internationally recognized norms of protection. Today, a
proposed social group must not only be composed of individuals who share a
common immutable characteristic, but the group must also meet both
"particularity" and "social distinction" requirements.5 3 As will be discussed
in Section IV, these new requirements make it almost impossible for children
fleeing forced recruitment o qualify for asylum in the United States.
A. The BIA's Seminal Definition of a "Particular Social Group" in Matter
of Acosta: Widely Accepted for More Than Two Decades
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not define "membership
in a particular social group," leaving the definition to be developed in case
law. The BIA, as the highest administrative appellate body in the Executive
Office for Immigration Review in the Department of Justice, reviews appeals
of decisions made by immigration judges and DHS district directors.5 4 BIA
decisions are binding unless overturned by the Attorney General or a federal
court. Thus, an analysis of case law on the interpretation of particular social
group must start with the BIA.
In 1985, in the seminal case Matter ofAcosta, the BIA defined membership
in a particular social group as membership in a "group of persons[,] all of
whom share a common, immutable characteristic.5 6 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the BIA relied on the principle of ejusdem generis, which means "of the
same kind.",5 7 The BIA noted that the other four protected grounds-race,
religion, nationality, and political opinion-also describe "an immutable
characteristic.,5 8 Accordingly, the BIA noted that the shared characteristic of
49. See Frydman & Desai, supra note 22, at 21 ("Few federal courts have analyzed nexus in the
context of social group claims as those claims are generally denied on the basis of a failure to prove
particularity and visibility.").
50. Matter ofAcosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
51. UNHCR Brief Henriquez-Rivas, supra note 37, at 14.
52. See UNHCR GUIDANCE ON GANGS, supra note 15, at 1.
53. Matter ofM-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 232.
54. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Board of Immigration Appeals, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.
htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2014).
55. Id.
56. Matter ofAcosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (In Acosta, the BIA found that membership in a taxi
collective did not constitute membership in a particular social group because that membership was
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a particular social group must be one "that either is beyond the power of an
individual to change or that is so fundamental to his identity or conscience
that it ought not to be required to be changed.,5 9 The BIA explained that the
shared characteristic "might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship
ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as
former military leadership or land ownership[.]
' 60
1. Acosta is Widely Accepted in the Federal Courts
Under the deferential Chevron standard, the BIA's statutory interpretation
of the INA generally governs when a statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to a specific question, as it is with regards to the definition of a
particular social group.61 However, it is up to the federal courts of appeal to
ask whether the agency's interpretation is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute, in other words, if it is based on a reasonable policy
choice.62
Following Acosta, nearly all circuits adopted the BIA's formulation
described above.63 The Second Circuit was the sole legal outlier to not adopt
the Acosta standard, using instead a "voluntary associational relationship"
standard,64 but with an additional requirement that the social group be
"recognizable and discrete.,65 Thus, with the exception of the Second
Circuit, the Acosta immutable characteristic definition was widely recog-
nized in the United States for more than twenty years.66
The Acosta standard is not without its critics. Some scholars argued that 
particular social group should be defined much more broadly than as defined
59. Id. at 233-34; see also Tim S. Braimah, Defining a Particular Social Group Based on the
Meaning of Non-Discrimination in International Human Rights Law: Utilizing the Definition in
Deciding Refugee Claims Based on Sexual Orientation, 15 GLOBAL J. OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: C
SOCY & CULTURE 2, 25 (2015) (noting that two of the convention grounds are things that one cannot
change, and the other two are so fundamental to identity that one should not be required to change
them).
60. Matter ofAcosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233-34.
61. Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837,842-45 (1984).
62. Id. The federal courts of appeal have played an active role in interpreting the INA, in some
cases overturning BIA decisions. See GERMAIN, supra note 40, at 17-18.
63. See Frydman & Desai, supra note 22, at 2-6.
64. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991). The "voluntary associational relationship"
standard, initially developed by the Ninth Circuit, defined a social group as "a collection of people
closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common impulse or interest." See
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986). However, in 2000, the Ninth Circuit
shifted its position and adopted the Acosta formulation as an alternative. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS,
225 F.3d 1084, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2000).
65. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d at 664 (noting that the members of a social group must "possess some
fundamental characteristic in common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor-or
in the eyes of the outside world in general"); see also Saleh v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 240
(2d Cir. 1992).
66. See Ashley Huebner & Lisa Koop, New BIA Decisions Undermine U.S. Obligations To
Protect Asylum Seekers, NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. (Feb. 18, 2014), available at https://www.
immigrantjustice.org/litigation/blog/new-bia-decisions-undermine-us-obligations-protect-asylum-
seekers#.VsoqqfkrLBQ.
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by Acosta. Several scholars argued that social perception or societal
attitude should play a role in determining what constituted a particular social
group, not just the immutable or fundamental characteristic test.6 8 Others
have argued that the definition of a particular social group must not be too
broad, or it risks undermining the purpose and intent of the UN Refugee
Convention.6 9
There is good reason why the Acosta definition of a "particular social
group" was so widely accepted for so long. The Acosta standard provides a
clear and distinct method to analyze particular social group claims, a method
that is both flexible but delineated.70 Thus, it provides a formulation to define
a particular social group neither too broadly nor too narrowly. Scholars have
noted that the Acosta standard is "a standard that is capable of principled
evolution but not so vague as to admit persons without a serious basis for
claims to international protection.7' The Eleventh Circuit in Castillo-Arias
elaborated that, "Acosta strikes an acceptable balance between (1) rendering
'particular social group' a catch-all for all groups who might claim persecu-
tion, which would render the other four categories meaningless, and (2)
rendering 'particular social group' a nullity by making its requirements too
stringent or too specific.",
7 2
67. See Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account ofMembership in a Social Group as a Basis for
Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 39, 60 (1983) (stating that "[m]embership in virtually
any group should be sufficient."); see Maureen Graves, From Definition to Exploration: Social
Groups and Political Asylum Eligibility, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 739, 795 (1989) (arguing for a "broad,
literal interpretation of 'social group.").
68. See GuY GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (Oxford University Press
1983); see generally Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on
Persecution Due to Membership in A Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 505 (1993).
69. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of
the Meaning of "Membership of a Particular Social Group," in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: UNHCR'S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 215 (Erika Fuller,
Volker Turk & Frances Nicholson, eds., 2003) ("An overly broad interpretation is resisted for several
reasons. First, it is stated that the Convention was not intended to provide protection to all victims of
persecution only to those who come within one of the five Convention grounds .... Secondly, as a
matter of legal logic, the social group cannot be read so broadly that it renders the other Convention
grounds superfluous. Thirdly, it is argued that an overly broad definition of 'particular social group'
would undermine the balance between protection and limited State obligations implicit in the
Convention."); see also JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, 157-59 (Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
70. See FatmaMarouf, The Emerging Importance of "Social Visibility" in Defining a "Particular
Social Group" & its Potential impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender,"
27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 47, 53-54 (2008); Anthony R. Enriquez, Assuming Responsibility for Who
You Are: The Right to Choose "Immutable" Identity Characteristics, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 373, 389
(2013); see generally Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims,
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777 (2003).
71. JAMES C. HATHAWAY AND MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, 427 (Cambridge
University Press, 2014) at 427.
72. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006).
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2. The UNHCR's Definition of a "Particular Social Group," Incorporates
the Acosta Standard, as Does the Law in Many Other Countries
The UN Refugee Convention created the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to supervise the implementation
of the Convention by State parties.73 However, the UNHCR has no direct
enforcement mechanism.74 The UNHCR can only issue non-binding general
recommendations and guidelines, although these are meant to serve as legal
guidance for governments and judiciaries.
75
In 2002, the UNHCR issued "Guidelines on Membership of a Particular
Social Group" and outlined an approach that incorporated the Acosta
standard.76 In the Guidelines, the UNHCR laid out a two-step analysis for
defining particular social groups, incorporating both a "protected characteris-
tic" approach and, as an alternative, a "social perception" approach.77 The
"protected characteristics" approach, also known as an "immutability ap-
proach," defines a particular social group as a group of persons sharing a
common characteristic that is "innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise
fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one's human rights. 78
The "social perception" test holds that if a group is recognized as a group in
the society from which the asylum seeker fled, it may also be a particular
social group.79 However, the UNHCR explained that the "social perception"
definition of a particular social group was only an alternative test.80 If the
common characteristic defining the group was immutable, unchangeable, or
fundamental, no further analysis need be done.81
73. 1951 Convention, supra note 7, at art. 35; see also UNHCR & SUPERVISION OF INT'L REFUGEE
LAW, supra note 32, at 21-22.
74. See UNHCR & SUPERVISION OF INT'L REFUGEE LAW, supra note 32, at 5.
75. See Statute of the Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428 (V) (Dec. 14,
1950); 1951 Convention, supra note 7, at art. 35; UNHCR Brief Henriquez-Rivas, supra note 37, at
10-11; see also U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: "Member-
ship of a Particular Social Group" within the context ofArticle JA(2) the 1951 Convention and/or its
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HRC/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002)
[hereinafter UNHCR, Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group].
76. UNHCR, Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group, supra note 75, at para. 10
(noting that state parties to the UN Refugee Convention had developed differing interpretations of a
particular social group and that those interpretations should be reconciled).
77. Id. atpara. 11-13.
78. Id. at para. 11. "[T]he 'protected characteristics' approach (sometimes referred to as an
'immutability' approach), examines whether a group is united by an immutable characteristic or by a
characteristic that is so fundamental to human dignity that a person should not be compelled to
forsake it. An immutable characteristic may be innate (such as sex or ethnicity) or unalterable for
other reasons (such as the historical fact of a past association, occupation or status) .... A
decision-maker adopting this approach would examine whether the asserted group is defined: (1) by
an innate, unchangeable characteristic, (2) by a past temporary or voluntary status that is unchange-
able because of its historical permanence, or (3) by a characteristic or association that is so
fundamental to human dignity that group members should not be compelled to forsake it." Id. at para
6.
79. Id. at para. 13.
80. Id.
81. See id.
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The UNHCR's incorporation of the Acosta formulation into its own
definition is just one indication of the international acceptance of that
formulation. Common law countries with well-developed case law on
asylum, including New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom, have also
adopted the Acosta immutability standard.82 Australia has adopted the
UNHCR's approach, defining a particular social group as one whose mem-
bers share common characteristics, or alternatively, are socially percep-
tible.8 3 In contrast, however, the Council of the European Union has defined
a particular social group as one that meets both the protected characteristic
and social perception tests.84 Nevertheless, the Council has noted that
member states have the power to use a test more favorable to the protection
seeker, and while most European states have underdeveloped refugee case
law, only Germany has clearly adopted this dual requirement judicially. 85
While neither the UNHCR Guidelines nor decisions by foreign countries
are binding on the United States, such decisions and guidelines are helpful in
understanding whether U.S. interpretations are in accordance with the
meaning and purpose of the UN Refugee Convention.8 6 The widespread
international acceptance of the Acosta immutable characteristics tandard
provides further support for maintaining this formulation without additional
changes for particular social groups in the United States.
82. See Rossi, supra note 31, at 418 (citing Ward v. Att'y Gen. of Can., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689
(Can.); Re GJ [1993] No. 1312/93 (Refugee Status App. Auth. Aug. 30, 1995) (N.Z.), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b6938.html; Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't,
[1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), available at http:// www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/jd990325/islam0l.htm.); see also Marouf, supra note 70, at
55-57.
83. S v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] 206 ALR 242, 16 (Austl.);
see also Benjamin Casper et al., Matter of M-E-V-G- and the BIA's Confounding Legal Standard for
"Membership in a Particular Social Group," IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, no. 14-06, 8 (June 2014).
84. Council Directive 2004/83/EC, art. 10, 2004 O.J. (L304/12), available athttp://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri =CELEX:32004L0083:en:HTML; Council Directive 2011/95/
EU, art. 10, 2011 (L337/9), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri =celex%
3A32011L0095. The UNHCR has criticized the European Union for this language requiring a
cumulative test, rather than an alternative test. See UNHCR comments on the European Commis-
sion's proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards
for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of
international protection and the content of the protection granted, 8 (2009), available at http://www.
unhcr.org/4c5037f99.pdf.
85. Council Directive 2011, supra note 84 at Preamble, para 14, 2011; see also MICHELLE FOSTER,
UNHCR Div. OF INT'L PROT., THE 'GROUND WITH THE LEAST CLARITY': A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO 'MEMBERSHIP OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP' 16,
24-27 (2012), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4f7d8d189.pdf; see also Brief of Fatma Marouf,
Thomas & Mack Legal Clinic, Univ. of Nevada, Las Vegas, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, at 22 (9th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Marouf Brief
Henriquez-Rivas].
86. See Marouf, supra note 70, at 57; 1951 Convention, supra note 7, at art. 35; UNHCR,
Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group, supra note 75.
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B. The BIA Improperly Limited the Definition of "Particular Social
Group" by Adding "Particularity" and "Social Visibility"
Requirements
Despite the widespread and longstanding acceptance of the Acosta defini-
tion of a particular social group in U.S. and international law, in 2006, the
BIA laid out an additional requirement for a particular social group: "social
visibility." 8 7 In Matter of C-A-, the BIA held that "noncriminal government
informants" could not constitute a particular social group because the very
nature of the conduct at issue was secretive and kept out of the public eye,
thus failing to satisfy a requirement of "social visibility. '8 8 In reaching its
decision, the BIA relied on the Second Circuit's determination that a social
group must be "externally distinguishable."8 9 The BIA also referenced the
UNHCR Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group,90 interpret-
ing the Guidelines to confirm "visibility" as an important factor in the
determination of refugee status.91 In a case that followed, Matter of A-M-E-
and J-G-U-, the BIA referenced both "social visibility" and "particularity"
when analyzing whether or not a particular social group existed.
92
In 2008, in Matter of S-E-G, a case that addressed particular social group
membership based on resistance to gang recruitment, the BIA formally
imposed the two new distinct requirements of "social visibility" and "particu-
larity" for a proposed social group.93 As to the particularity requirement, the
BIA described the test as "whether the proposed group can accurately be
described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group would be recog-
nized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of persons."' 94 The BIA
defined social visibility in Matter of S-E-G- to require that "the shared
characteristics of the group should generally be recognizable by others in the
community[.],
95
The BIA, at the time it issued its decision in Matter of S-E-G-, gave no
indication why it was adding two new requirements to the definition of a
87. Matter of C-A-, supra note 16, at 959.
88. Id. at 951,960.
89. Id. at 956; see also Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
90. UNHCR, Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group, supra note 75.
91. Matter of C-A-, supra note 16, at 951, 960; see also Lindsay M. Harris & Morgan M. Weibel,
Matter of S-E-G-: The Final Nail in the Coffin for Gang-Related Asylum Claims?, 20 BERKELEY LA
RAZAL.J. 5, 11 (2010).
92. In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74-76 (B.I.A. 2007) (holding that "affluent
Guatemalans" fails as a particular social group under the social visibility and particularity
requirements).
93. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008) (holding that "Salvadoran youth who
have been subjected to recruitment efforts by the MS-13 gang and who have rejected or resisted
membership in the gang based on their own personal, moral, and religious opposition to the gang's
values and activities" was not a particular social group); see also Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
591 (B.I.A. 2008) (holding that "young persons who are perceived to be affiliated with gangs" are not
a particular social group).
94. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 584.
95. Id. at 586.
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particular social group.96 In a later decision, the BIA explained that the
Acosta definition had led to "confusion and a lack of consistency.,97 The BIA
claimed that it added the new requirements in order "to provide clarification
and address the evolving nature of the claims presented by asylum
applicants."98
1. The BIA's New Requirements Led to a Circuit Split, with the Seventh
and the Third Circuit Rejecting the New Requirements
In the wake of Matter of C-A- and Matter of S-E-G-, the circuits split as to
whether to accord Chevron deference to the requirements of "particularity"
and "social visibility." Most circuits followed the BIA
interpretation, with the First,99 Second,0 0 Fifth,10 1 Sixth,10 2 Eighth,10 3
and Eleventh10 4  Circuits explicitly accepting the BIA's additional
requirements. Other circuits, including the Fourth,10 5 Ninth, 10 6 and
96. Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960; Matter of E-A-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 591; Matter of
S-E-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 579, 584.
97. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 231-32 (B.I.A. 2014). ("At the time we issued
Matter of Acosta ... relatively few particular social group claims had been presented to the
Board .... Now, close to three decades after Acosta, claims based on social group membership are
numerous and varied. The generality permitted by the Acosta standard provided flexibility in the
adjudication of asylum claims. However, it also led to confusion and a lack of consistency as
adjudicators struggled with various possible social groups, some of which appeared to be created
exclusively for asylum purposes.").
98. Id. at 232.
99. Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2009) (rejecting the proposed particular
social group of "noncriminal government informants" and reasoning that the BIA permissibly
elaborated on the pre-existing definition of a "particular social group"); see also Tay-Chan v. Holder,
699 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2012); Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2010).
100. Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the BIA's
interpretation of particular social group in Matter ofAcosta and Matter of C-A- is "reasonable and
merits our deference under Chevron"); see also Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir.
2007).
101. Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2012) ("[W]e stand with the
majority of our sister circuits by deciding that he BIA's interpretation of the term "particular social
group" is entitled Chevron deference.").
102. Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 671-72 (6th Cir. 2013) ("The BIA's definition of
"particular social group" warrants deference ... and thus '[w]e defer to the reasonable boundaries
that the Board creates with respect to the phrase."') (citing Solis Gonzalez v. Holder, 523 Fed. Appx.
320, 321, (6th Cir. 2013)).
103. Gaitan-Gamez v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 681-82 (8th Cir. 2012) ("As a result, this court
cannot find that the social visibility and particularity requirements articulated in Matter of S-E-G- are
arbitrary or capricious..."); see also Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753-54 (8th Cir. 2011);
Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder, 662 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2011).
104. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1197 (lth Cir. 2006) (finding that
non-criminal drug informants were not a "particular social group," under the "social visibility"
requirement).
105. Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 165 n.4 (4th Cir. 2011) (The Court applied the new
requirements but noted that it has "not yet decided whether such requirements comports with the
INA.").
106. Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010) (The Court never describes "social
visibility" and "particularity" as requirements but does state that the BIA clarified that a group must
have both in order to constitute a particular social group); see also Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d
855, 858-62 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that "young Honduran men who have been recruited by MS-13
but refuse to join" is a group that is both too large and not visible to Honduran society); but see
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Tenth10 7 either signaled a qualified acceptance of the new BIA requirements
or applied the new factors without specifically ruling on them.
The Seventh and Third Circuits, on the other hand, explicitly or implicitly
refused to apply Chevron deference to the BIAs new requirements, holding
that they were inconsistent with Matter of Acosta and numerous previous
decisions.10 8 In 2009, in Gatimi v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
BIA's "social visibility" test. 109 The Seventh Circuit specifically found that
that the BIAs additional requirement of "social visibility" was inconsistent
with the BIAs previous decisions, citing to cases in which the BIA found
"particular social groups" to be cognizable without consideration to "social
visibility." 0 The Seventh Circuit also found the new requirement to be
unreasonable, explaining that persecuted groups often seek to "avoid being
socially visible."' 1 As a result of its holding that the BIAs ruling was both
inconsistent with previous decisions and unreasonable, the Seventh Circuit
held that the "social visibility" requirement was not entitled to deference. 
1 2
In 2011, the Third Circuit explicitly agreed with the Seventh Circuit and
refused to apply Chevron deference to both BIA requirements of "social
visibility" and "particularity." 13 In Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General
of the United States, the Third Circuit held that the new requirements were
inconsistent with the BIAs previous decisions and that they were an
"unreasonable addition" to the particular social group definition. 1 1 4 Regard-
ing the "social visibility" requirement, the Third Circuit argued that for
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013) (The Ninth Circuit specified that
"social visibility" was only consistent with BIA precedent so long as it did not mean "on-sight"
visibility. "Absent a requirement of on-sight visibility, "social visibility" as detailed in C-A- is
consistent with BIA precedent prior to C-A-.").
107. Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 650, 652 (10th Cir. 2012) (The Tenth Circuit
noted that the BIA's social visibility requirement was inconsistent with the UNHCR's definition in
which social visibility was to be used as an alternative test, but held that this inconsistency did not
make the BIA's test per se unreasonable.).
108. See Gatimi v Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. U.S.
Att'y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 606 (3d Cir. 2011).
109. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d at 613-16 (Gatimi and his family were defectors of the Mungiki
group, a political and religious violent group in Kenya. The BIA held that defectors of the Mungiki
group did not constitute a particular social group because they lacked "social visibility").
110. Id. (citing In re Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. 357, 365-66 (B.I.A. 1996) (young women of a tribe
that practices female genital mutilation but who have not been subjected to it); In re Toboso-Alfonso,
20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822-23 (B.I.A. 1990) (homosexuals); In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. at
662 (former members of the national police); In reAcosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (B.I.A. 1985)
(former military leaders or land owners)).
111. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d at 615-16 (The Court argued that if "social visibility" was
required in Gatimi's case, "[t]he only way, in the Board's view, that the Mungiki defectors can qualify
as members of a particular social group is by pinning a target to their backs with the legend 'I am a
Mungiki defector."').
112. Id. ("[W]hen an administrative agency's decisions are inconsistent, a court cannot pick one
of the inconsistent lines and defer to that one, unless only one is within the scope of the agency's
discretion to interpret the statutes it enforces or to make policy as Congress's delegate.") (citing AT &
T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3d 830, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Idaho Power Co. v. FERC, 312 F.3d 454, 461-62
(D.C. Cir. 2002)).
113. Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 606-07.
114. Id. at 604.
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groups previously recognized as particular social groups, the new social
visibility requirement would provide an insurmountable obstacle for mem-
bers of those groups if they were to apply for asylum today.1 1 5 The Third
Circuit also criticized the "particularity" requirement. The court argued that
"particularity" and "social visibility" were merely "different articulations of
the same concept" and thus, "particularity" was also inconsistent with prior
BIA decisions and unreasonable. 
116
2. The UNHCR, Scholars, and Immigration Advocates Reject the New
BIA Requirements
In response to BIAs narrowing of the definition of particular social group,
the UNHCR submitted an amicus brief to the Third Circuit in Valdiviezo-
Galdamez for guidance on relevant international standards.1 7 In its amicus
brief, the UNHCR argued that the BIA relied upon an "incorrect" interpreta-
tion of the UNHCR Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group
when adding "social visibility" and "particularity" to the definition of a
particular social group.18 The UNHCR reiterated that the analysis of a
particular social group was a two-step analysis. 1 1 9 Only if the proposed group
is found not to share an immutable or fundamental characteristic, should
further "social perception" analysis be done to determine "whether the group
is nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that society."120 In an
amicus brief to the Ninth Circuit in Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, the UNHCR
put the BIAs error in stark terms noting that "[i]nexplicably, and without
justification, the Board has turned this disjunctive into a conjunctive. Put
differently, the Board has turned "Acosta or" into "Acosta and." 
121
The UNHCR further criticized the BIAs formulation of both "social
visibility" and "particularity." According to the UNHCR, whether a group is
perceived as a group in society requires that members share "a common
attribute that is understood to exist in the society or that in some way sets
them apart or distinguishes them from the society at large."122 It does not
115. Id.
116. Id. at 608 ("We are hard pressed to discern any difference between the requirement of
particularity' and the discredited requirement of 'social visibility.' Indeed, they appear to be different
articulations of the same concept[.]").
117. Brief of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49ef25102.html [hereinafter UNHCR Brief Valdiviezo-
Galdamez]; see also UNHCR Brief Henriquez-Rivas, supra note 37.
118. UNHCR Brief Valdiviezo-Galdamez, supra note 117, at 3-4 ("S-E-G- and the line of
decisions the Board relied on in the instant case inaccurately cite the UNHCR Social Group
Guidelines in support of the 'social visibility' requirement. This interpretation of the UNHCR
Guidelines is incorrect.").
119. Id. at 4; see also UNHCR, Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group, supra
note 75.
120. UNHCR Brief Valdiviezo-Galdamez, supra note 117, at 10.
121. UNHCR Brief Henriquez-Rivas, supra note 37, at 17.
122. UNHCR Brief Valdiviezo-Galdamez, supra note 117, at 11.
2016]
306 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:287
require that this group be visible to the "naked eye in a literal sense of the
term." 123 In regards to the BIA's requirement of "particularity," the UNHCR
argued that the size of a particular social group is not a "relevant criterion"
for the determination of a particular social group.124 Notably, the UNHCR
stated that the BIA's addition of the new requirements for defining a
particular social group is inconsistent with the "purpose and intent of the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol." 
125
Scholars and immigration advocates also strongly criticized the BIA's
requirements as set forth in Matter of S-E-G-. 126 Critics echoed the UNHCR's
clarification of its formulation for a particular social group and affirmed the
error made by the BIA in interpreting the UNHCR Guidelines.127 Scholars
also faulted the BIA for conflating the analysis of a particular social group
with nexus,128 and for failing to define either particularity or social visibility
clearly. 129 Finally, many criticized the BIA's requirement of social visibility,
arguing that if it meant ocular visibility, this requirement was inconsistent
with previous cases. 30
C. The BIA Attempts to Clarify the "Social Visibility" and "Particularity"
Requirements: Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-
In the face of criticism from scholars, immigration activists, the Seventh
and Third Circuits, and the UNHCR, the BIA issued two precedential
decisions in February of 2014 clarifying the requirements for establishing a
123. Id.
124. Id. at 15.
125. Id. at 3; see also UNHCR Brief Henriquez-Rivas, supra note 37, at 4.
126. See Casper, supra note 83, at 1; see, e.g., Letter from Deborah Anker, et al. (on behalf of
seventy-two immigration law professors and instructors), Clinical Professor of Law, Director,
Harvard Immigration & Refugee Clinical Program, Harvard Law School, as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents for Certification of Matter of S-E-G-, to Eric H. Holder, Att'y Gen. (Jan. 27, 2010),
available at http://www.ilcm.org/litigation/AG-certification-amicus-law-professors.PDF; [HEREIN-
AFTER ANKER AMICI LETTER]; BENJAMIN CASPER, REGINA GERMAIN, AND ILANA GREENSTEIN, THE
CONVOLUTION OF PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP LAW: FROM THE CLARITY OF ACOSTA TO THE CONFUSION
OF S-E-G-, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS'N (2010), available at https://www.ilcm.org/documents/
litigation/AILA-Advisory-Social-Group-new.pdf [hereinafter THE CONVOLUTION OF PSG LAW];
Marouf, supra note 70; Frydman & Desai, supra note 22; Marouf Brief Henriquez-Rivas, supra note
85; Letter from NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., et al. (on behalf of seventeen HRL organizations and
practitioners), as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents for Certification of Matter of S-E-G-, to Eric
H. Holder, Att'y Gen. 2 (Jan 27, 2010), available at http://www.ilcm.org/litigation/AG-certification-
amicus NIJC.pdf; Brief for NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Henriquez-Rivas vs. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2012), available at http://immigrantjustice.org/
sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/HENRIQUEZ%20NIJC%20amicus%20Final.pdf [hereinafter NAT'L
IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. Amici Curiae Brief].
127. See, e.g., THE CONVOLUTION OF PSG LAW, supra note 126, at 568.
128. See, e.g., Anker Amici Letter, supra note 126, at 4; Frydman & Desai, supra note 22, at 3.
129. See, e.g., Frydman & Desai, supra note 22, at 3; THE CONVOLUTION OF PSG LAW, supra note
126, at 568-69.
130. See NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. Amici Brief, supra note 126, at 2; Anker Amici Brief,
supra note 126, at 3; THE CONVOLUTION OF PSG LAW, supra note 126, at 565-69; Rossi, supra note 31,
at 417-20.
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particular social group. 13 1 In Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, the
BIA claimed it was addressing confusion resulting from the Acosta
definition;132 however, it did not analyze the immutable characteristic stan-
dard in these companion cases. 133 Instead, the BIA attempted to refine what it
meant by "social visibility" and "particularity," and formalized a three-part
test for establishing a particular social group. 134 The BINs new test requires
that a particular social group be "(1) composed of members who share a
common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3)
socially distinct within the society in question."
135
In Matter of M-E-V-G-, the BIA clarified that the social visibility factor
does not require "literal" or "ocular" visibility. 136 The BIA stated that social
visibility instead means "social distinction" or whether the group is recog-
nized as a distinct entity within the society from which the asylum applicant
is fleeing.137 The BIA also explained that society, not the persecutor, must
hold the perception that the social group exists. 138 However, the BIA did not
ultimately decide whether or not the proposed social group of "Honduran
youth who had been actively recruited by gangs but who have refused to join
because they opposed the gangs" was cognizable, and instead remanded the
case for analysis in light of its clarification. 
139
The BIA addressed particularity in Matter of M-E-V-G-, holding that a
particular social group "must be defined by characteristics that provide a
clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group." 140 In addition,
"[t]he group must also be discrete and have definable boundaries-it must
not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective."141
In Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA held that "particularity" chiefly addresses
the question of delineation, or as earlier court decisions described it, the need
to put 'outer limits' on the definition of 'particular social group."' 142 The
proposed social group, "former members of the Maral 8 gang in El Salvador
who have renounced their gang membership," lacked particularity because it
131. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 1. & N. Dec.
208 (B.I.A. 2014).
132. Matter ofM-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 231-32.
133. See Casper, supra note 83, at 18.
134. Matter ofM-E- V- G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 227.
135. Id. at 238.
136. Id. at 228 ("The term was never meant o be read literally. The renamed requirement 'social
distinction' clarifies that social visibility does not mean 'ocular' visibility either of the group as a
whole or of individuals within the group any more than a person holding a protected religious or
political belief must be "ocularly" visible to others in society.").
137. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227; see also Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208,
217 (B.I.A. 2014) (The BIA stated that, "[s]ocial distinction exists where the relevant society
perceives, considers, or recognizes the group as a distinct social group.").
138. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242 (Social distinction is "determined by the
perception of the society in questions, rather than by the perception of the persecutor.").
139. Id. at 228, 253.
140. Id. at 239 (citing In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (2007)).
141. Id. at 240.
142. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 214.
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was "too diffuse, as well as being too broad and subjective."143 As with
"social distinction," particularity must also take into account the societal
context where the claim arises. 144
In both M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-, the BIA acknowledged that there was
overlap between particularity and social distinction, specifically because
both must take account of the societal context of the claim in question. 145
However, the BIA argued that the "social distinction" and "particularity"
requirements emphasize a different aspect of a particular social group. 
14 6
Five circuit courts have weighed in on the BIA's clarified "particularity"
and "social distinction" requirements. The Second Circuit gave express
deference to the new clarified requirements,147 and the Fourth Circuit
incorporated the clarified requirements in its analysis of a particular social
group.148 The First and the Tenth Circuits, having previously adopted the
"social visibility" and "particularity" requirements, discussed the clarifica-
tions but argued that they do not necessitate a change in the analysis of
whether a particular social group is cognizable.149 The Ninth Circuit dis-
cussed the clarifications but expressly left open the question of whether the
BIA's requirements of "social distinction" and "particularity" constitute a
reasonable interpretation of a particular social group. l50
143. Id. at 221.
144. Id. at 214 ("The definition of a particular social group is not addressed in isolation, but
rather in the context of the society out of which the claim for asylum arises. In assessing a claim, it
may be necessary to take into account the social and cultural context of the alien's country of
citizenship or nationality.").
145. Matter ofM-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 240-41; Matter of W-G-R-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 214.
146. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 214.
147. Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 196 and 199 (2d Cir. 2014) (In remanding the case to
consider whether "young Albanian women" or "young Albanian women between the ages of 15 and
25" qualify as a particular social group, the court stated that it gives Chevron deference to the BIA's
requirements of social distinction and particularity as clarified in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of
W-G-R.).
148. Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 58 and 62 (41h Cir., 2015) (The Court laid out the new
requirements for a particular social group, but remanded the case to the BIA to determine if the
proposed social groups of "Salvadorans who are former members of MS 13 and who left the gang,
without its permission, for moral and religious reasons," or "Salvadorans who were recruited to be
members of MS 13 as children and who left the gang as minors, without its permission, for moral and
religious reasons," were cognizable in light of unconsidered evidence.).
149. Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 238, 243 (P1 Cir, 2015) (The Court declined to remand the
case based on M-E-V-G- stating that "the change in terminology did not depart from the BIAs prior
interpretation, but merely clarified that literal ocular visibility "is not, and never has been, a
prerequisite for a viable particular social group." ); Rodas-Orellana, 780 F.3d 982, 991 and 998 (10h
Cir. 2015) (In finding that "El Salvadoran males threatened and actively recruited by gangs, who
resist joining because they oppose the gangs" was not socially distinct and therefore not a particular
social group, the court held that "Matter of M E V G and Matter of W G R- do not alter this
analysis.").
150. Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2014). ("Here, once again, we leave open
the question of whether the BIA's construction of "particular social group" is reasonable. First, we
have not been asked to do so. Second, and more important, as is clear from W G R and M E V G
the term is in flux, and it is premature to determine precisely how the rule will be implemented.").
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D. "Particularity" and "Social Distinction" Requirements Are
Unacceptable Additions to the Particular Social Group Definition
In Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA claimed that
"particularity" and "social distinction" are not new requirements, rather they
are simply a clarification of the Acosta immutability test. 1 51 The BIA claimed
that it merely "clarified the definition of the term [particular social group] to
give it more 'concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudica-
tion.' 1 5 2 As support for this claim, the BIA cited the Fifth Circuit statement
that the "particularity" and previous "social visibility" requirements were
"not a radical departure from prior interpretation, but rather a subtle shift that
evolved out of the BIAs prior decisions on similar cases." 
15 3
On the contrary, the new three-part test for a particular social group is a
significant change. In order to demonstrate that one is member of a particular
social group, an asylum applicant must provide evidence to meet not just the
immutability standard, but the two additional requirements as well. Failure to
meet any one of those three elements is fatal to a proposed social group. It is
notable that in Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA never considered whether or not
the proposed social group was composed of persons who share an immutable
characteristic. 154 Rather, the BIA simply held that the proposed group failed
to meet the "particularity" requirement and that the applicant failed to
provide evidence demonstrating "social perception." 1 5 5 Thus, the Acosta test
was not even considered in the BIAs decision, being superseded by the
"social distinction" and "particularity" requirements.
Practically, having to meet this new three-part test greatly increases the
evidentiary burden of an asylum applicant. 156 In Matter of M-E-V-G-, the
BIA made clear that "a successful case will require evidence that members of
the proposed particular social group share a common immutable characteris-
tic, that the group is sufficiently particular, and that it is set apart within the
society in some significant way." ' l 7 The BIA states that evidence such as
"country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of
discriminatory laws and policies, historical animosities, and the like may
establish that a group exists and is perceived as 'distinct' or 'other' in a
particular society." 1 5 8 However, the BIA does not explain how these pieces of
151. Matter ofM-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 237 ("By defining these concepts in Matter of C-A-
and the cases that followed it, we did not depart from or abrogate the definition of a particular social
group that was set forth in Matter ofAcosta; nor did we adopt a new approach to defining particular
social groups under the Act."); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 211.
152. Matter ofM-E- V- G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 237.
153. Id. at 237 (citing Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2012)).
154. Matter of W- G-R-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 208.
155. Id.
156. An asylum applicant has the burden of establishing that he meets the definition of a refugee.
8 C.F.R § 208.13(a) (b) (2015).
157. Matter ofM-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec at 244.
158. See id.
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evidence will demonstrate something as intangible as a "societal
perception." 
15 9
These new requirements are unduly burdensome, particularly for pro se
applicants. Having a lawyer is one of the most important factors in determin-
ing an applicant's success.160 Not only might it be difficult to obtain
necessary evidence, but a pro se applicant without knowledge of asylum law
will have difficulty articulating a social group that meets the new require-
ments. 161 However, while asylum seekers are allowed to have an attorney to
represent them,162 the government does not provide counsel for asylum
seekers, not even for children.163 Many asylum seekers cannot afford
representation,164 and pro bono immigration legal services are extremely
limited. 165
More importantly, the combined requirements of "particularity" and "so-
cial distinction" create a potentially unsolvable dilemma. Particularity, as
defined by the BIA in Matter of M-E-V-G-, suggests hard limits and requires
specificity of definition.166 A group cannot be too broad or too diffuse.
However, if a proposed social group has been defined with sufficient
particularity, then it would likely be too narrow to meet the requirement of
social distinction. 167 For example, in Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA held that the
proposed group of "former gang members" needed to be defined with more
specificity.
[W]hen a former association is the immutable characteristic that defines
a proposed group, the group will often need to be further defined with
159. See Marouf, supra note 70, at 71-78.
160. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz, & Philip Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Dispari-
ties in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007) (noting that represented asylum
seekers were granted asylum 45.6 percent of the time, while those without representation were
granted asylum only 16.3 percent of the time).
161. See NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., Particular Social Group Practice Advisory: Applying
for Asylum After Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- 5 (Feb. 2014) [hereinafter NIJC,
Particular Social Group Practice Advisory]; see also NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. Amici Curiae
Brief, supra note 126, at 15-16 (describing the asylum application form which asks an applicant to
name the protected ground on which their application is based, but in the case of the ground of
membership in a particular social group, does not ask the applicant to define the group nor give any
guidance on what qualifies as a particular social group).
162. INA § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A).
163. Id.
164. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIG. REV., OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS,
& TECHNOLOGY, FY 2014 Statistics Year Book Fl (Mar. 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fyl4syb.pdf ("Many individuals who appear
before EOIR [immigration courts] are indigent and cannot afford a private attorney").
165. See Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor,
21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3 (2008).
166. See generally Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014).
167. See Linda Kelly, The New Particulars ofAsylum's "Particular Social Group," 36 WHITTIER
L. REV. 219, 232 (2015); see also NIJC, Particular Social Group Practice Advisory, supra note 161,
at 5 ("Thus, the particularity requirement, as defined in M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-, effectively precludes
the use of common parlance labels to describe a PSG, even as the social distinction test requires that a
PSG be limited by parameters a society would recognize.").
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respect to the duration or strength of the members' active participation
in the activity and the recency of their active participation if it is to
qualify as a particular social group under the Act. 168
If the proposed group in Matter of W-G-R- had been defined with this degree
of particularity, it is unlikely that the Respondent would have been able to
find sufficient evidence to demonstrate social distinction. For example,
former gang members who were leaders within the last two years would not
necessarily be socially distinguishable from former gang members who were
only members five years ago. This is a dilemma that many applicants now
face when attempting to articulate their particular social group under the new
requirements.
Finally, the BIA's articulation of the "particularity" requirement is problem-
atic because it implies that the size of a group should be considered when
determining particularity. 169 In Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA states that the size
of a proposed group may be an important factor in a social group analysis, 
170
and holds that one reason for the failure of the proposed groups in that case
was that they made up "a potentially large and diffuse segment of soci-
ety[.]" 17 1 In Matter of M-E-V-G-, the BIA held that "the 'particularity'
requirement relates to the group's boundaries or... the need to put 'outer
limits' on the definition of a 'particular social group.' 172
The UNHCR has criticized the BIA's formulation of "particularity,"
arguing that the size of a particular social group is not a "relevant criterion"
for the determination of a particular social group. 173 Several circuit courts
have also stated that the size or breadth of a particular group should not
preclude the court from finding the group to be cognizable.174 Indeed, the
INA does not require that a particular social group be limited by size, and a
size limitation is improper. If the BIA is truly applying the ejusdem generis
168. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 1. & N. Dec. 208, 221-22 (B.I.A. 2014).
169. See Kelly, supra note 167, at 233 ("Despite the BIA's protestations to the contrary,
'particularity' remains a means of arbitrarily restricting the size of a 'particular social group.'").
170. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008) ("While the size of the proposed
group may be an important factor in determining whether the group can be so recognized, the key
question is whether the proposed description is sufficiently 'particular[]'").
171. Id. at 585.
172. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 238-39 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing Castellano-Chacon
v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir. 2003); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir.
1986)) ("The group must also be discrete and have definable boundaries it must not be amorphous,
overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.").
173. UNHCR Brief Valdiviezo-Galdamez, supra note 117, at 15; see also UNHCR Brief
Henriquez-Rivas, supra note 37, at 21 ("[lIt is a well-established principle that 'the fact that large
numbers of persons risk persecution cannot be a ground for refusing to extend international
protection where it is otherwise appropriate."').
174. See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 E3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting the that "the size and
breadth of a group alone does not preclude a group from qualifying as such a social group."); Cece v.
Holder, 733 E3d 662, 673-74 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that "the breadth of category has never been a
per se bar to protected status.").
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principle to the formulation of a particular social group,175 then size or
breadth limitations, explicit or otherwise, on a particular social group fail that
principle. No "outer limits" on size or breadth are required for the other
protected grounds. 176 A member of a persecuted religious group or political
party could still have a basis for an asylum claim even if the members of the
religious group or political party were a majority in the country.
One of the often-cited justifications for limiting the definition of particular
social groups is the floodgates argument: the argument that when a particular
social group is defined too broadly, it will result in a flood of new asylum
seekers to the United States. 177 Asylum claims arising from our neighbors to
the south have historically awakened a fear of a rising flood of asylum
seekers. 178 As will be explored in Section IV, the BIA narrowed the definition
of "particular social group," incorporating the new "social distinction" and
"particularity" requirements, in the context of gang-based claims, most likely
in order to limit the success of such claims. 
179
This reaction is inappropriate for several reasons. First, the argument that
allowing for a broad definition of a particular social group will result in a
flood of new asylum seekers is specious because there are other requirements
in place that limit successful claims. Even if an asylum applicant is found to
be a member of a particular social group, she still faces the difficult challenge
of demonstrating that she has a well-founded fear of returning to her home
country and that there is a nexus between her persecution and her particular
social group. 180 Children targeted for recruitment by gangs or armed forces,
even if they can demonstrate that they are members of a cognizable social
group, will still have to prove that they were persecuted on account of their
membership in that group. For example, if an armed force or a gang forcibly
recruits individuals without discrimination simply to fill their ranks, then a
175. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
176. See UNHCR Brief Henriquez-Rivas, supra note 37, at 22.
177. See, e.g., DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 487 (7th ed.
2014); Rossi, supra note 31, at 423-28 (2013); CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES ET.AL., A
TREACHEROUS JOURNEY: CHILD MIGRANTS NAVIGATING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 22 (2014)
[hereinafter A TREACHEROUS JOURNEY]; Frydman & Desai, supra note 22, at 3 n.23.
178. Frydman & Desai, supra note 22, at 28; Musalo, supra note 22, at 132-33; Benjamin H.
Harville, Ensuring Protection or Opening the Floodgates?: Refugee Law and its Application to Those
Fleeing Drug Violence in Mexico, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 135, 139 (2012) ("Specifically, many
adjudicators likely fear that favorable asylum decisions will provoke a torrent of Mexican asylum
seekers at U.S. ports of entry, clogging the asylum system and leading to fraudulent claims.").
179. See infra Section IV.B.; see also Casper, supra note 83, at 21; Rossi, supra note 31, at 423
("What, exactly, is preventing the courts or Congress from amending the asylum laws in particular,
clarifying the meaning of "particular social group" and creating defenses to the overbroad exclusion-
ary bars so that former child soldiers can access asylum protection in the United States? The answer
likely is twofold: the government fears, first, that liberalizing the definition of 'particular social
group' will open the so-called floodgates of applicants from South America with gang-related claims,
and, second, that weakening the exclusionary bars might lead to the admission of people who are a
danger to national security.").
180. See Matthew D. Muller, Deborah E. Anker & Lory Diana Rosenberg, Escobar v. Gonzalez:
A Backwards Step for Child Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law in Particular Social Group Claims,
10 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 243, 248-49.
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claim from a child fleeing that forced recruitment may fail because of a lack
of nexus.""
In addition, an asylum seeker who qualifies as a refugee may still be
denied asylum if certain statutory bars are applicable. 18 2 These bars include
participation by the asylum seeker in the persecution of others, the commis-
sion by the asylum seeker of a serious nonpolitical crime outside of the
United States prior to arrival, giving material support to a terrorist organiza-
tion, or convincing reasons to believe the asylum seeker poses a threat to
national security.18 3 Children that were forced to become child soldiers or
gang members may well be barred from asylum depending on what crimes or
acts they may have perpetrated.
Historically, the floodgate concern has proven to be unfounded in previous
cases where it was argued. For example, the floodgates argument was made
when the BIA found in In Re Kasinga that "young women who are members
of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been
subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and who
oppose the practice" were members of a particular social group.184 Yet, this
decision has not led to a marked increase in FGM-related cases.18 5 The
floodgates argument was raised again when the courts were considering
whether or not to acknowledge domestic violence as a potential basis for
asylum.18 6 However, now that domestic violence can be the basis of a
successful asylum claim,187 there has not been a dramatic increase in the
number of women seeking asylum in the United States.188
181. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 242 (B.I.A. 2014) ("[1]t is important to
distinguish between the inquiry into whether a group is a 'particular social group' and the question
whether a person is persecuted "on account of' membership in a particular social group. In other
words, we must separate the assessment whether the applicant has established the existence of one of
the enumerated grounds (religion, political opinion, race, ethnicity, and particular social group) from
the issue of nexus."). A discussion of nexus as it applies to children fleeing forced recruitment is
outside the scope of this paper, but for an excellent discussion of nexus issues see Anjum Gupta, The
New Nexus, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 377 (2014); Anjum Gupta, Nexus Redux, 90 IND. L.J. 465 (2015).
182. INA § 208(b)(2); 8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(2) (2014).
183. Id.
184. In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
185. See Muller et al., supra note 180, at 248 (citing U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Serve's.,
Questions and Answers on the R-A-Rule (Dec. 7, 2000), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/
default/files/RARule USCIS 12 07 2000.pdf.).
186. See Musalo, supra note 22, at 132-33.
187. See Matter of R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec 629 (B.I.A. 2008); Y.V.Z. v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 492 Fed.
Appx. 291 (3d Cir. 2012); see also U.S. CITIZEN & IMMGR. SERV'S, ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING,
FEMALE ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS 15 (Mar. 2009), available at https://www.
uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%2OAsylum/Asylum/AOBTC%
20Lesson%20Plans/Female-Asylum-Applicants-Gender-Related-Claims-3 1 aug 10.pdf.
188. Musalo, supra note 22, at 132-33 (after explicitly noting that there was no "appreciable
increase in the number of claims based on FGM" after the Kasinga decision, the INS stated that "it
did not expect to see a large number of claims if the U.S. recognized domestic violence as a basis of
asylum"); see also U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. Supplemental Brief in Matter of L-R- 13 n.10 (April
2009) available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter of LR DHSBrief 4 13
2009.pdf (stating that there has not been a notable increase in asylum claims on the basis of domestic
violence).
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Finally, neither the BIA nor the immigration courts should be interpreting
immigration law so as to manage the flow of incoming asylum seekers for
political purposes.189 Courts should not be making broad policy decisions
outside of Congressional action.1 90 Nor should courts be interpreting the law
in a manner that diverges from internationally recognized norms of protec-
tion.1 91 The BIA misconstrued the UNHCR Guidelines on Membership in a
Particular Social Group and impermissibly narrowed the definition of a social
group.192 As a result, U.S. law regarding particular social group claims
diverges from internationally recognized norms of protection.
II. SIMILAR EXPERIENCES BUT DIFFERING NARRATIVES: BACKGROUND ON
CHILD SOLDIERS AND CHILDREN IN GANGS
The new definition of a particular social group was developed in the
context of gang-related claims and has been devastating to claims from
children fleeing gangs in Central America, as will be discussed fully in
Section IV. If the new definition of particular social group is applied
consistently, it will also be devastating to the claims of children in similar
circumstances, including children fleeing forced recruitment as child sol-
diers. While the new definition was most likely intended to limit claims from
individuals fleeing gangs in Central America, its potential negative effect
upon other children fleeing forced recruitment was likely an unintended
consequence. This is because children fleeing gangs in Central America and
children fleeing armed forces are viewed through dramatically different
narrative lenses. Children fleeing gangs face suspicion and hostility in the
United States,19 3 yet there is significant concern for and advocacy on behalf
of child soldiers both in the United States and internationally. 
194
These differing narratives exist even though the experiences of children
who are forcibly recruited as child soldiers and the experiences of children
189. See Harville, supra note 178, at 183 ("An adjudicator seeking to use floodgates concerns to
deny asylum relief will not find legal justification within the pages of the immigration statute. In fact,
if an immigration judge were to deny relief explicitly based on floodgates concerns, the decision
would almost certainly be overturned as an unconstitutional violation of due process and equal
protection.").
190. See Muller et al., supra note 180, at 248 n.18 (citing Petition for Rehearing En Banc 12,
Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2005) ("if Congress concludes that the current law grants
asylum to too many persons, it is free to modify that law, but it is not this Court's function to make
such policy determinations.")).
191. See Harville, supra note 178, at 183-84 ("[O]ne would be extremely hard-pressed to argue
that the history and spirit of refugee law supports asylum denials based on floodgates concerns.").
192. UNHCR Brief Valdiviezo-Galdamez, supra note 117. See also Hathaway and Foster, supra
note 71 at 432. ("The notion that both tests must be met is impossible to justify by reference to the
rules of treaty interpretation; indeed, there has been no attempt to explain the principled bases on
which such an approach could be supported.")
193. Rick Moran, Huge majority ofAmericans want the illegal alien kids to go home, AMERICAN
THINKER (July,28, 2014); A TREACHEROUS JOURNEY, supra note 177, at 62.
194. ROMEO DALLAIRE, THEY FIGHT LIKE SOLDIERS, THEY DIE LIKE CHILDREN: THE GLOBAL
QUEST To ERADICATE THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS (Walker & Co. 2010).
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recruited by gangs in Central America are virtually indistinguishable. Chil-
dren forcibly recruited by gangs share many of the same characteristics as
children recruited by armed forces to be child soldiers. Gangs and armed
forces recruit children because of the vulnerabilities of age that make the
children easily manipulated and controlled. 195 If children resist recruitment,
members of the gangs or armed forces threaten the children with harm or
death.196 Once recruited, leaders in the groups subject the children to the
same horrific abuses and treatment.197 It is difficult or impossible for child
soldiers or child gang members to leave their groups, and if they try to leave,
they face the same threats of severe harm and death.1 98 If they do manage to
escape, they face a negative social stigma, as well as exile and punishment
from their families, neighbors, and governments. 199
A comparison of the experiences of both groups of children demonstrates
the speciousness of the different narratives. It also serves as a powerful
demonstration of the problem with interpreting asylum standards so as to
limit the cognizability of specific claims. The negative impact of the new
definition of a particular social group will not be limited to those fleeing
gangs in Central America, but will also negatively impact other groups of
children that otherwise engender worldwide sympathy and support.
A. Child Soldiers
Human rights groups estimate that there are hundreds of thousands of boys
and girls under the age of eighteen serving in armed conflicts in almost every
region of the world.200 However, very few children fleeing forced recruit-
ment as child soldiers make it to the United States to apply for asylum.
20 1
Many of the countries in which children are used as soldiers are countries
195. See, e.g., Diane Uchimiya, Falling Through the Cracks: Gang Victims as Casualties in
Current Asylum Jurisprudence, 23 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 109, 153 (2013); Melissa James, Fleeing
the Maras: Child Gang Member Seeking Refugee Status in the United States, 25 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J.
1, 6 (2005); MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS 35-36 (Harvard University Press 2006).
196. See, e.g., LAURA PEDRAZA FARINA, SPRING MILLER & JAMES L. CAVALLARO, No PLACE TO
HIDE: GANG, STATE AND CLANDESTINE VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR 72-73 (Harvard University Press
2010); Nina Bernstein, Taking the War Out of a Child Soldier, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/nyregion/13soldier.html.
197. See, e.g., FARINA, supra note 196, at 75-77; WESSELLS, supra note 195, at 60-62.
198. See, e.g., UNHCR GUIDANCE ON GANGS, supra note 15, at 7; Nagle, supra note 29, at 15.
199. See, e.g., Uchimiya, supra note 195, at 130-31; P.W. SINGER, CHILDREN AT WAR 200-01
(Pantheon Books 2005).
200. There are no exact statistics available, but figures have ranged from 250,000 to 500,000
children engaged in armed conflict throughout the world. See Franklyn Bai Kargbo, International
Peacekeeping and Child Soldiers: Problems of Security and Rebuilding, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 485,
487 (2004); see also Facts about Child Soldiers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 3, 2008), https://www.hrw.
org/news/2008/12/03/facts-about-child- soldiers.
201. See Rossi, supra note 31, at 405 (noting that the number of unaccompanied children seeking
asylum in the United States from countries known to have child soldiers was less than 100 for the
period from 2008 to 2009); see also Bernstein, supra note 196; see also Brief for Human Rights First
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 28, Negusie V. Mukasey, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009), 2008
WL 2597010 (June 23, 2008).
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from which the United States is inaccessible except by boat or plane.20 2 Child
soldiers without sponsors are unlikely to have the resources to travel to the
United States,20 3 or the ability to obtain proper travel documents.20 4
UNICEF defines a child soldier as "any child-boy or girl-under 18
years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or
armed group in any capacity, but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers,
and anyone accompanying such groups other than family members.20 5
Child soldiers also include "girls and boys recruited for forced sexual
purposes and/or forced marriage.,20 6 Groups that target children for forced
recruitment include: governments, paramilitaries, other forces linked to
governments, and non-state armed groups such as rebel forces.20 7
Most child soldiers are between the ages of thirteen and eighteen; how-
ever, armed forces are increasingly recruiting children aged twelve and
under, including children as young as seven.208 Groups that target children
for recruitment do so precisely because they are children, not simply to fill
their ranks.20 9 Children have unique emotional and physical vulnerabilities
that make them easy to control and manipulate, and thus make them more
obedient.210 Furthermore, children are inherently reckless, which makes
202. UNICEF Press Release, supra note 1 (According to the United Nations and UNICEF,
"thousands of boys and girls are associated with armed forces and armed groups in conflicts in over
20 countries around the world[,]" including Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, the Central African
Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan).
203. See Nicholas Van Hear, Working Paper No. 6, "1 Went as Far as My Money Would Take Me:"
Conflict, Forced Migration and Class 12, CTR. ON MIGRATION, POL'Y & SOCY (2004) (discussing the
part class plays on migration patterns).
204. Nonimmigrant visas may be authorized for specific purposes, but these do not include
seeking protection. According to a report issued by DHS and the U.S. Department of State, "it can be
much more difficult for applicants who are unemployed or marginally employed to show that they
intend to return to their country after visiting the United States." HUMAN SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICK-
ING CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS &
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, A PRIMER ON VISA AND VISAS FRAUD 7 (2008),
available at http://www.ilw.com/immigdaily/news/2008,0708-visafraud.pdf.
205. Children and Armed Conflict, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/emergencies/index-
childsoldiers.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2016). However, the United States has defined child soldiers
as "children under age 15 in some countries [who] are forcibly recruited by regular or irregular armies
to participate directly in military conflicts." Jeff Weiss, Acting Dir., OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Memorandum, Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims
1 (Dec. 10, 1998), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws%20and%20
Regulations/Memoranda/Ancient%20History/ChildrensGuidelines 121098.pdf.
206. Children and Armed Conflict, supra note 205.
207. See generally COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, CHILD SOLDIERS: GLOBAL
REPORT 2008, available at http://www.child-soldiers.org/global-report-reader.php?id=97 [hereinaf-
ter CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008].
208. WESSELLS, supra note 195, at 7-8 (noting that the average age of child soldiers in Uganda in
2004 was under thirteen, that boys under age twelve were specifically targeted during the conflicts in
Liberia and Sierra Leone, and that armed groups recruited children as young as seven in the
Democratic Republic of Congo); see also Nienke Grossman, Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting
Child Soldiers for Human Rights Violations, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 323, 325 (2007) (noting that in
Colombia, rebel groups forcibly recruit children as young as eight).
209. SINGER, supra note 199, at 58; WESSELLS, supra note 195, at 37-40; Uchimiya, supra note
195, at 153.
210. Facts about Child Soldiers, supra note 200; see also WESSELLS supra note 195, at 35-36
(noting that "[y]oung children are controllable through terror and brutality" and that "[c]hildren's
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them malleable in high-danger situations.2 11 Certain physical features of
children, such as small hands and small size, make them useful for activities
such as planting or clearing landmines.12 Technological developments in
weaponry, particularly lightweight automatic weapons, mean that children
can more easily carry and use arms.2 13 Child soldiers may serve as laborers,
guards, spies, scouts, porters, runners, "wives," or soldiers, including in
combat and on the front line. 14
Some children voluntarily choose to join government or rebel forces, often
because of social or economic pressure.215 For many other children, there is
no question that armed forces forcibly and often violently recruit them to
serve.2 16 Orphaned children, who are prevalent in war-torn areas or areas
hard hit by AIDS, are particularly susceptible to forced recruitment.2 17 The
methods used to recruit children are horrific. Children are abducted,21 8
beaten and subjected to bodily harm,2 19 and threatened with death or harm to
their family members if they do not join.220
Once recruited, especially if forcibly recruited, armed forces subject child
soldiers to appalling abuses including physical violence such as beatings and
torture. 221 Leaders in these armed groups target some children, particularly
girls, for sexual abuse and rape.222 The introduction of drugs, sometimes
under duress, and the resulting addiction is often used as a means of
control.22 3 Armed groups regularly threaten the children with further harm
pliability derives in part from their early level of psychological development and limited life
experience."); SINGER, supra note 199, at 29, 58.
211. See Lonegan, supra note 31, at 92 (citing studies about the underdevelopment of certain
areas in children's brains responsible for making judgments, controlling impulses, or planning
effectively).
212. See SARAH MUSCROFT, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: REALITY OR RHETORIC? 53 (International Save
the Children Alliance 1999).
213. See Nagle, supra note 29, at 14-15; see also IRIN News, Too small to be Fighting in
Anyone's War (Dec. 1, 2003), available at http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID-3684.
214. Facts about Child Soldiers, supra note 200; see also Too Small to be Fighting in Anyone's
War, supra note 213.
215. For some children, joining the ranks of an armed force may appear to be their only form of
survival. This, combined with their infancy, begs the question of whether children truly can ever
freely choose to become soldiers. See Tiefenbrun, supra note 27, at 426-27 (noting that "voluntary
recruitment is often coupled with hidden forms of coercion."); see also WESSELLS, supra note 195, at
32-33.
216. Facts about Child Soldiers, supra note 200; see also CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008,
supra note 207, at 14.
217. See SINGER, supra note 199, at 42-43 (Pantheon Books 2005).
218. Tiefenbrun, supra note 27, at 419-21.
219. See Bernstein, supra note 196 (When a rebel group came to take Salifou Yankene and his
brother as a new recruit, one rebel chopped off Salifou's brother's hand with a machete when his
mother tried to protect him.)
220. Id.; see also Karen Allen, Bleak Future for Congo's Child Soldiers, BBC NEWS (July 25,
2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5213996.stm (When a child refused to join a Congolese
militia, a militia member shot him in the head).
221. SINGER, supra note 199, at 71; WESSELLS, supra note 195, at 60-62.
222. WESSELLS, supra note 195, at 86.
223. Id. at 76-77.
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and death if they do not cooperate or perform well.22 4 Children who serve as
soldiers also experience the horrors of war.225 In some cases, the armed
groups will coerce a child to kill his or her family members, neighbors, or
other children. This not only causes psychological harm but also makes it
particularly difficult for the child to ever return home.226 Whether a child is
forcibly recruited or voluntarily joins an armed force, he will find himself
coerced into remaining a child soldier.227 Children who try to escape, if
caught, may be beaten, tortured, or killed.228
Children who are able to escape from situations of forced recruitment
often face new forms of persecution. Their families and their communities
may ostracize or exile them.229 If the child was forced to join a rebel group,
the government may view the child with suspicion and detain or punish
him.230 For example, the Ugandan Government often subjects former child
soldiers to punishment and torture, including being held in pits. 231 The
Ugandan government also uses former child soldiers to clear minefields.2 32
In Burundi, the Government has beaten and detained children as young as
age nine for suspected collaboration with rebels.233
B. Children in Gangs in Central America
In contrast to the small numbers of child soldiers coming to the United
States, in the last two decades, there has been an increasing number of
children fleeing gang violence in Central American countries traveling to the
United States.234 In the last five years, there has been a  exponential growth
in the number of children, in particular unaccompanied children, arriving at
the U.S.-Mexico border seeking entry to the United States. This growth
reached a high of nearly 70,000 children in fiscal year 2014.235 While the
224. SINGER, supra note 199, at 71-72; WESSELLS, supra note 195, at 61-62.
225. WESSELLS, supra note 195, at 74-76.
226. Id. at 59; Facts about Child Soldiers, supra note 200; SINGER, supra note 199, at 74.
227. WESSELLS, supra note 195, at 33.
228. Nagle, supra note 29, at 15.
229. Id. at 16; SINGER, supra note 199, at 200-01.
230. Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, supra note 207, at 18.
231. Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Special Advisory Opinion
from U.S. Department of State to the Third Circuit).
232. Id.
233. CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008, supra note 207, at 18.
234. See generally USAID, CENTRAL AMERICAAND MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT (2006), available
at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf-docs/Pnadg834.pdf.
235. FY 2014 runs from October 2013 to September 2014. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, MISSION TO CENTRAL AMERICA: THE FLIGHT OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN TO THE UNITED
STATES 2 (2013), http://www.usccb.org/about/migration-policy/upload/Mission-To-Central-America-
FINAL-2.pdf [hereinafter MISSION TO CENTRAL AMERICA]; see also Chishti, Unaccompanied, supra
note 22; Muzaffar Chishti & Faye Hipsman, Dramatic Surge in the Arrival of Unaccompanied
Children Has Deep Roots and No Simple Solutions, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (June 13, 2014),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/dramatic-surge-arrival-unaccompanied-children-has-deep-
roots-and-no-simple-solutions [hereinafter Chishti, Dramatic Surge]; A TREACHEROUS JOURNEY,
supra note 177; Jens Manuel Krogstad & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Number of Latino children caught
trying to enter U.S. nearly doubles in less than a year (June 10, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/
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numbers of such children entering the United States has decreased since
2014, there is still a significant number of children making the dangerous
journey to the United States.2 36 The vast majority of these children are
coming from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.2 37 While there is
widespread generalized violence in these countries, many of these children
face a particularized threat of forced recruitment by the gangs there.238
There are many gangs operating in Central America, the most prominent
of which are the Mara Salvatruchas (also known as MS or the Maras).239 The
Maras have two main branches, MS-18 and MS-13, and operate in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.240 The Maras have their roots in the
United States, having formed in Los Angeles, California, in the 1960s and
1980s respectively.24 1 In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act reclassified many crimes as aggravated felonies for
the purposes of deportation, resulting in the removal of thousands of MS-18
and MS-13 gang members to Central America.24 2 Those gang members in
turn set up numerous gang cells in the countries they reached. 3
The Central American gangs share many characteristics of rebel or
insurgent groups that use child soldiers. Many gangs may start as primarily
criminal economic enterprises. However, in order to thrive, the gangs in
Central America needed to challenge and usurp political authority.244 The
Central American gangs have been highly successful at seizing political
fact-tank/2014/06/ I 0/number-of- latino-children-caught-trying-to-enter-u-s-nearly-doubles-in-less-
than-a-year/.
236. Southwest Border Unaccompanied Children Statistics, supra note 19; Teresa Wiltz, Unac-
companied Children from CentralAmerica, One Year Later: The Immigration Status of Many of these
Children Remains in Flux, STATELINE (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
unaccompanied-children- from-central-america-one-year-later_55db88b4e4b04ae497041 d 10 (noting
that many factors have led to the decline in numbers including increased apprehensions by Mexican
authorities).
237. MISSION TO CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 235, at 2; USAID, CENTRAL AMERICA AND
MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT, supra note 234.
238. MISSION TO CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 235, at 2-3. KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 2 ("When
asked why they left their home, fifty-nine percent of Salvadoran boys and sixty-one percent of
Salvadoran girls list crime, gang threats, or violence as a reason for their emigration. Whereas males
most feared assault or death for not joining gangs or interacting with corrupt government officials,
females most feared rape or disappearance at the hands of the same groups.").
239. There are many other gangs, but none as large or well-organized as the Maras. See Juan J.
Fogelbach, Gangs, Violence and Victims in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, 12 SAN DIEGO
INT'L L.J. 417, 421-22 (2011); see also UNHCR GUIDANCE ON GANGS, supra note 15.
240. WOLA, CENTRAL AMERICAN GANG-RELATED ASYLUM: A RESOURCE GUIDE 2 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Central%20America/past/CA%2OGang-
Related%20Asylum.pdf.
241. MS-18 was a gang that formed in the Rampart section of Los Angeles in the 1960s and was
primarily composed of Mexican-Americans but grew to incorporate large numbers of young men
fleeing the civil wars in Central America in the 1980's. MS-13 was formed in the early 1980's in the
same Los Angeles neighborhood by young men and boys from El Salvador who were looking for a
way to protect themselves from existing gangs at the time. Fogelbach, supra note 239, at 420-21.
242. Id. at 421.
243. Id.
244. See generally MAX G. MANWARING, STREET GANGS: THE NEW URBAN INSURGENCY (Strategic
Studies Institute 2005), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub597.
pdf.
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power in localities throughout the region.2 45 They have also created both
economic and political instability in the countries in which they operate.24 6
For example, the Maras in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have
established a sophisticated, highly organized, and widespread presence. 7 In
many rural areas, particularly outside of capital cities, gangs are the defacto
political authorityt248 Scholars have described Central American gangs as
"third generation gangs."49 Third generation gangs are "de facto govern-
ments, controlling significant territory (competing with the state for
power).,25 0 Governments are increasingly unable to protect citizens from the
violence of the gangs.2
Some gangs, including the Maras, rely heavily on forced recruitment.2
The gangs target "young people who are poor, homeless and from marginal-
ized segments of society or particular neighborhoods.,25 3 Street children are
especially vulnerable to forced recruitment. 4 Gangs also systematically
recruit in schools.2  Some children are recruited to perform crimes for
gangs, such as collecting bribes, even if they have not yet passed the
initiation rites that make them a full gang member. 6 Gangs in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras also specifically target children under the age of
twelve. 7 One reason for targeting younger children in El Salvador is that
children under twelve are mostly immune from prosecution.2 5 8 However, in
general gangs in Central America target children for recruitment for the same
reasons that armed forces do: children have physical and emotional vulner-
245. Id. at 3.
246. Id.
247. FARINA, supra note 196, at 57-67; USAID, CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG ASSESS-
MENT, supra note 234, at Annex 1: El Salvador Profile, 45.
248. MISSION TO CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 235, at 5; John P. Sullivan, Maras Morphing:
Revisiting Third Generation Gangs, 7 GLOBAL CRIME 487, 494-95 (2006).
249. See generally MANWARING, supra note 244, at 3; Deborah Anker & Palmer Lawrence,
"Third Generation" Gangs, Warfare in Central America, and Refugee's Law's Political Opinion
Ground, 14-10 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2014).
250. Anker & Lawrence, supra note 249 at 1 (noting that "[t]he gangs often use brutal tactics to
fight for territorial and political power."); see also MANWARING, supra note 244, at 3 (noting that third
generation gangs are "engaged in a highly complex political act political war.").
251. MANWARING, supra note 244, at 3.
252. UNHCR GUIDANCE ON GANGS, supra note 15, at 7; see also FARINA, supra note 196, at 72
(quoting an NGO coordinator who works with youth on the outskirts of San Salvador: "People join
gangs because they have to. In the past, youth had the luxury of joining voluntarily."). As with child
soldiers, there may be a false dichotomy between children who are forcibly recruited and those who
"voluntarily" join because for many children in Central America, joining a gang may seem to be the
only option for survival. See James, supra note 195, at 6.
253. UNHCR GUIDANCE ON GANGS, supra note 15, at 7.
254. Id. at 15; see also UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, CONSIDER-
ATION OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 44 OF THE CONVENTION 84-85 (June
8, 2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45377ee3.html.
255. See Fogelbach, supra note 239, at 432; FARINA, supra note 196, at 74 (noting that gangs have
been targeting increasingly younger children, even as young as eight or nine years old).
256. MISSION TO CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 235, at 15 n. 11; FARINA, supra note 196, at 73-74.
257. Fogelbach, supra note 239, at 431.
258. Id.
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abilities that make them easier to control.25 9
It is extremely dangerous to resist recruitment by gangs. Gangs will
threaten, physically harm, and even kill individuals who resist or are
perceived to resist the gang, as well as those individuals' family members.2 60
For those forcibly recruited, initiation rituals are "characterized by violent
and abhorrent acts, requiring recruits to endure physical and sexual violence
as well as to commit serious crimes, including murder.,261 Gang leaders
often beat child gang members and even kill them if they refuse to cooperate
as a warning to other gang members.2 62 Gangs force children to take drugs as
a method of control.2 63 Female child gang members experience rape and
sexual violence.2 64 Once a child becomes a member of a gang, it is nearly
impossible to leave the gang. Gangs also threaten physical harm and death to
those who try to leave the gang and to their family members.265
If a child is able to escape a gang, he may face retaliation by the
government or by his community. In most Central American countries there
is a social stigma against former gang members or those perceived to be
former members.26 6 Central American governments also target those per-
ceived to be affiliated with gangs.267 In Honduras for example, the Govern-
259. James, supra note 195, at 6 (2005) (noting that the Maras have complete control over
forcibly recruited child gang members).
260. UNHCR GUIDANCE ON GANGS, supra note 15, at 12; see also FARINA, supra note 196, at
72-73, 89-92; UNHCR, CHILDREN ON THE RUN: UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN LEAVING CENTRAL
AMERICA AND MEXICO AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 26-27 (2014) [CHILDREN ON THE
RUN], available at http://www.unhcrwashington.org/sites/default/files/ UACChildren%20on%20
the%20RunFull%20Report.pdf.
261. UNHCR GUIDANCE ON GANGS, supra note 15, at 7; see also FARINA, supra note 196, at
75-76.
262. See Roles and Responsibilities of Child Soldiers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 2004), http://www.
hrw.org/reports/2004/liberiaO2O4/6.htm (describing how children were beaten and abused by older
gang members, and forced to witness abuse and killings); WOLA, supra note 240.
263. CHILDREN ON THE RUN, supra note 260, at 33.
264. See Caroline Moser & Alisa Winton, Working Paper No. 171, Violence in the Central
American Region: Towards an Integrated Framework for Violence Reduction 27, U.K. OVERSEAS
DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (2002), available at http://www.odi.org.uk/publicationsworking-papers/
wpl7 l-a.pdf (noting the use of gang rapes as a part of gang initiations and more generally).
265. UNHCR GUIDANCE ON GANGS, supra note 15, at 7. USAID, CENTRAL AMERICA AND
MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT, supra note 234; JACQUELINE BHABHA & SUSAN SCHMIDT, SEEKING
ASYLUM ALONE: UNACCOMPANIED AND SEPARATED CHILDREN AND REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES 20, 131 (2006), available at http://www.childtrafficking.com/Docs/seek-asylum-alone us
0108.pdf; Greg Campbell, Death by Deportation: A Denver Judge Denied a 16-Year-Old's Political
Asylum Application and Sentenced Him to Death, BOULDER WKLY., May 27, 2004 (detailing the
murder of a former MS-13 member after losing his asylum claim and being deported back to
Guatemala).
266. SEELKE, supra note 4, at 6; see also USAID, CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG
ASSESSMENT, supra note 234, at 48; Thomas Boerman, Youth Gangs in El Salvador: Unpacking the
State Department 2007 Issue Paper, IMMGR. DAILY, http://www.ilw.com/articles/2010,1117-boerman.
shtm (last visited Mar. 14, 2016) (noting that former gang members are at risk of abuse from a number
of sources other than their own gang).
267. See, e.g., Raphaele Bail, Marked Men with No Place to Hide, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug.
18, 2004), http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0818/pl2sOl-woam.html (noting that anti-gang laws in
Honduras allow the police to make arrests based simply on gang membership "or even for simply
having a tattoo" and that the crime "illicit association" can carry a nine to twelve year jail sentence);
see also Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 540 (2003) (citing the U.S. State Department's
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ment specifically targets children suspected of being gang members and is
responsible for beating and even killing suspected child gang members.268
The media in Central America sensationalizes the gangs, leading to tougher
enforcement measures against the gangs.269
C. The Disparate Narratives of Children Fleeing Forced Recruitment
Despite the substantively similar experiences of children recruited by
gangs or by armed forces, the narratives surrounding these children could not
be more different. Child soldiers are portrayed as innocent abductees forced
to undergo horrors.270 In contrast, children in gangs are depicted as potential
or actual violent juvenile criminals.271 The language used to describe these
children helps illustrate why the world community looks at child soldiers and
gang members so differently, even though the subjective experiences of these
children are substantially similar. Inherent in the word "child" in "child
soldier" is the implication of a lack of voluntary association with the adult
world of armed combat. The term "soldier" in the best case implies an
individual who fights for his country, but even in the worst case, still
correlates to fighters for a political cause. In contrast, the term "gang"
denotes criminality of an economic and violent bent.27 2 The term "member"
2000 Report on Human Rights Practices in Honduras that "Honduran government officials have been
involved in targeting children suspected of being in gangs.").
268. See Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 540 (2003) (noting the testimony of a country
condition expert that "children who are assumed to be in gangs, because of tattoos or for other
reasons, are at grave risk of being killed or tortured in Honduras, either by state security forces or
vigilante groups that appear to act with impunity. Furthermore, when arrested, children frequently
face the use of excessive force by the State, including extra-judicial executions.").
269. SEELKE, supra note 4, at 6; USAID, CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT,
supra note 234, at 48, 71; Fogelbach, supra note 239, at 444 ("The [Honduran] government's massive
campaign against gangs and the media's tendency to over-exaggerate the problem create a misin-
formed perception that youths in gangs are to blame for the majority of crimes in the country.").
270. See, e.g., David Pimental, The Widening Maturity Gap: Trying And Punishing Juveniles As
Adults In An Era Of Extended Adolescence, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 71, 97-98 (2013) ("Overwhelm-
ingly, these young offenders inducted into the LRA are viewed as victims: innocent children swept up
in political and criminal ... forces far beyond their ability to reckon or cope."); see also Innocence
Lost: The child soldiers forced to murder, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.independent.co.
uk/news/world/africa/innocence-lost-the-child-soldiers-forced-to-murder- 1052026.html ("[A]s a child
soldier Ojok was as much a victim as his victims.").
271. See, e.g., Influx of Illegal Alien Minors Energizes Violent U.S. Street Gang MS-13, JUDICIAL
WATCH (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2015/09/influx-of-illegal-alien-minors-
energizes-violent-u-s-street-gang-ms-13/ ("[T]he nation's most violent street gang has been ener-
gized by the barrage of illegal immigrant minors who have entered the U.S. through Mexico,
confirming a Judicial Watch report last summer that gangs were actively recruiting members at
shelters housing the new arrivals."); Child Border Surge Includes Mara Salvatrucha Gang Elements,
INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY (July 9, 2014), http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/070914-708067-
border-surge-includes-significant-criminal-element.htm; see generally Pimental, supra note 270, at
97-99 (discussing the disparate treatment of child soldiers and children in U.S. street gangs);
Tiefenbrun, supra note 27, at 423-24.
272. In Central America, the media sensationalizes the violence and criminality of gangs.
Fogelbach, supra note 239, at 443-44; WOLA, supra note 240.
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implies voluntary association with that criminality,273 and there is no inclu-
sion of age in the term.
The attention and concern of the international community towards chil-
dren fleeing armed forces and gangs reflects these differing narratives. There
are many international and U.S. organizations and projects dedicated to
ending the use of child soldiers and to reintegrating child soldiers into
society.274 The United Nations has a Special Representative for Children and
Armed Conflict who launched a campaign with UNICEF aimed at eradicat-
ing the recruitment and use of child soldiers.27 5 The U.S. Congress held
hearings on child soldiers and recommended special forms of immigration
relief for former child soldiers.27 6 There are numerous books written about
the experiences of child soldiers.27 7
In contrast, there is much less support, particularly in the United States, for
children fleeing gangs in Central America. It is true that the recent surge
of children arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border increased the attention paid to
children recruited by gangs in Central America.278 However, in many cases
these children face outright hostility from both the U.S. government and
society.27 9 For example, during a Congressional hearing in the summer of
273. See, e.g., James, supra note 195, at 1 ("child gang members are often excluded from the
human rights regime because the act of joining a gang, unlike being forcibly recruited into armed
conflicts, is often viewed as a voluntary association with an "enterprise with a sole criminal purpose")
(quoting Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76594 (Dec. 7, 2000)); Arteaga v.
Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2007) (ruling that membership in a gang cannot constitute a
particular social group for the purposes of asylum and withholding of removal because the court
could not "imagine holding that a voluntary association ... is fundamental to human dignity")
(emphasis added).
274. See, e.g., Child Soldiers, HUM. RTs. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/topic/childrens-rights/child-
soldiers (last visited Mar. 18, 2016); CHILD SOLDIERS INT'L, http://www.child-soldiers.org/ (last
visited Mar. 18, 2016); Child Soldiers, INT'L RESCUE COMMITTEE, http://www.rescue.org/child-
soldiers (last visited Mar. 18, 2016); INVISIBLE CHILDREN, http://www.invisiblechildren.com (last
visited Mar. 18, 2016); NAT'L IMMIGR. JUSTICE CENTER, https://www.immigrantjustice.org/ (Mar. 18,
2016).
275. Children, Not Soldiers, OFFICE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR CHILDREN
& ARMED CONFLICT, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/children-not-soldiers (last visited Mar.
18, 2016).
276. Casualties of War: Child soldiers and the Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human
Rights and the Law on the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 23 (2007). Ending the Use of Child
Soldiers: History, Impact and Evolution: Hearing Before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission,
113th Cong. (2014).
277. See, e.g., EMMANUEL JAL & MEGAN LLOYD DAVIES, WAR CHILD: A CHILD SOLDIER'S STORY
(St. Martin's Press 2010); FAITH J. H. MCDONNELL & GRACE AKALLO, GIRL SOLDIER: A STORY OF
HOPE FOR NORTHERN UGANDA'S CHILDREN (Chosen Books 2007); PETER EICHSTAEDT, FIRST KILL
YOUR FAMILY: CHILD SOLDIERS OF UGANDA AND THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY (Lawrence Hill Books
2009); SINGER, supra note 199; ALCINDA HONWANA, CHILD SOLDIERS IN AFRICA: THE ETHNOGRAPHY
OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE (2006); SCOTT GATES & SIMON REICH, Child SOLDIERS IN THE AGE OF
FRACTURED STATES: THE SECURITY CONTINUUM (2010); LEORA KAHN & LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO, CHILD
SOLDIERS (2008); BEAH, supra note 3; DALLAIRE, supra note 194.
278. See, e.g., Chishti, Unaccompanied Minors, supra note 22; Chishti, Dramatic Surge, supra
note 235.
279. See, e.g., Sarah Dutton, Jennifer De Pinto, Anthony Salvanto & Fred Backus, What do
Americans say should happen to child border crossers?, CBS NEWS (Aug, 7, 2014), http://www.
cbsnews.com/news/more-americans-say-child-border-crossers-should-be-sent-home-asap/; Rick Mo-
ran, Huge majority ofAmericans want the illegal alien kids to go home, AM. THINKER (July 28, 2014),
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2014, members of Congress repeatedly asked why the unaccompanied
children arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border could not be deported more
quickly. 280 The Obama administration reacted to the surge of children
arriving at the border in the summer of 2014 by placing unaccompanied
children in detention, often for longer than was allowed under the law.
281
Immigration judges heard the cases of unaccompanied children in "rocket
dockets," or fast tracked removal proceedings, without access to lawyers.
282
The administration also detained and denied bail to children who were
accompanied by family members.2 83 The BIA, for its part, improperly
narrowed the definition of a particular social group in the context of
gang-based cases. However, it did so in a way that negatively impacts asylum
claims from all children fleeing forced recruitment, including child soldiers.
III. THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE INTERPRETATION OF "PARTICULAR SOCIAL
GROUP" UNDER U.S. ASYLUM LAW FOR CHILDREN TARGETED FOR
FORCED RECRUITMENT
Children are among the most vulnerable individuals in any society. As
previously discussed, children may share certain characteristics, including
age, size, and reduced physical, mental, and emotional capacity, that make
them particularly susceptible to recruitment and manipulation by criminal
gangs, government or rebel militaries, or others.2 84 In most cases involving
the forced recruitment of a child, the child claims a fear of persecution on
account of his membership in a particular social group.285 Race, nationality,
http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/O7/huge-majority-of americans-want the illegal-alien_
kids_togo home.html; A TREACHEROUS JOURNEY, supra note 177, at 62 (noting that immigration
judges and ICE attorneys are at times hostile to the children at the border).
280. Wendy Feliz, American Immigration Council, Not All Members of Congress Recognize the
Nation's Role in Protecting Unaccompanied Minors., June 24, 2014; Dangerous Passage: The
Growing Problem of Unaccompanied Children Crossing the Border; Hearing Before the House
Committee on Homeland Security (1 1 31h Cong. 2014).
281. See Unaccompanied Children, WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMMISSION, https://womensrefugeecommission.
org/programs/migrant-rights/unaccompanied-children (last visited Mar. 18, 2016); see KENNEDY,
supra note 4, at 2 (July 1, 2014); see also William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act Of 2008, Pub. L. 110-45 (Dec. 23, 2008) (stating that unaccompanied alien
children in custody must be transferred to the care of the Secretary of Health and Human Services
within seventy-two hours).
282. Jayashri Srikantiah & Lisa Weissman-Ward, The Immigration "Rocket Docket": Understand-
ing the Due Process Implications, STAN. L. SCH. (Aug. 15, 2014), https://law.stanford.edu/2014/08/
15/the-immigration-rocket-docket-understanding-the-due-process-implications/.
283. Guillermo Contreras, Feds start "no bond" policy on detained immigrants, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/article/Feds-start-no-bond-policy-
on-immigrants-5716913.php; Julia Preston, Detention Center Presented as Deterrent to Border
Crossings, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/homeland-security-
chief-opens-largest-immigration-detention-center-in-us.html (Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh
Johnson indicated that the purpose of detention was to deter other mothers and children from making
the journey to the U.S.).
284. See supra Section III.
285. See SEBASTIAN AMAR ET AL., CAPITAL AREA IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS (CAIR) COALITION,
SEEKING ASYLUM FROM GANG-BASED VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA: A RESOURCE MANUAL (Aug.
2007); see also Frydman & Desai, supra note 22, at 23-24.
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or religion are very rarely factors in the forced recruitment of children by
gangs or armed forces.28 6 Political opinion is sometimes advanced as a
possible basis for persecution, especially for gang-based cases in which the
child resisted recruitment.28 7 However, due to infancy, it is often difficult for
children to demonstrate that they hold a political opinion.2 8
Under the Acosta formulation of a particular social group, there was room
for developing successful social groups in asylum claims involving the
forced recruitment of children. However, when the BIA narrowed the
definition of a particular social group by introducing "particularity" and
"social distinction" requirements, the result has been that children fleeing
forced recruitment today can rarely demonstrate that they belong to a
particular social group.
A. Children as a Particular Social Group in U.S. Asylum Law
The experiences of child asylum seekers are unique and do not always
clearly fit into prevailing asylum standards. However, the substantive asylum
standards for children and adults remain largely the same,28 9 and conse-
quently, children are disadvantaged in our system.290 This is not to say that
children should not have to meet the definition of a refugee. Rather, it is
important to understand that while a child's experiences may differ substan-
tively from an adult's, such experiences may nevertheless be a basis for
asylum. For example, with regard to whether or not a child has been
persecuted, the UNHCR has noted that experiences that may not rise to the
level of persecution for an adult may constitute persecution for a child.29 1
Several circuit courts have likewise recognized that the harm experienced by
286. See generally AMAR, supra note 285; see also Frydman & Desai, supra note 22, at 23-24.
287. See Frydman & Desai, supra note 22, at 15-20; Meghann Boyle, Paths to Protection: Ideas,
Resources, and Strategies for Presenting Central American Gang-related Asylum Claims, 07-11
IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 4-5 (2007); see generally Uchimiya, supra note 195, at 145-51.
288. See Deborah Anker, Nancy Kelly, John Willshire Carrera & Sabrineh Ardalan, Mejilla-
Romero: A New Era for Child Asylum, 12-09 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 8 (2012) ("The INS Children's
Guidelines explain that, '[j]ust as a younger child may have difficulty forming a well-founded fear of
persecution, the ability to form a political opinion for which one may be persecuted may be more
difficult for a young child to establish."') (citing Jeff Weiss, Acting Director, Office of International
Affairs, INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims 22
(Dec. 10, 1998)).
289. See Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature: Unaccompanied Child
Asylum Seekers and the New U.S. Guidelines, 11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 84, 97 n.52 (1999); Cruz Diaz v.
INS, 86 F.3d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1996) ("In the absence of statutory intent to apply a different standard
for ajuvenile, and in light of the reasonable interpretation by the INS that the standard as stated takes
into consideration the petitioner's age, we are not at liberty to substitute a different interpretation.").
290. See BHABHA & SCHMIDT, supra note 265, at 123-32; Michael Olivas, Unaccompanied
Refugee Children: Detention, Due Process, and Disgrace, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 159, 162 (2000).
291. Guidelines On International Protection: Child Asylum Claims Under Articles 1(A)2 and
1(F) of the 1951 Convention And/Or 1967 Protocol Relating To The Status Of Refugees, para. 4 (Dec.
22, 2009).
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292children may be less than that required of an adult to qualify as persecution.
Yet even if a child can demonstrate that the harm or abuse that he
experienced rose to the level of persecution, in order to qualify for asylum in
the United States, the child must also demonstrate that he was targeted for
persecution on the basis of a protected ground, such as membership in a
particular social group.293 However, U.S. asylum law does not, and has
never, recognized the characteristic of being a child alone as enough to
establish membership in a particular social group.2 94 Historically, even when
the Acosta formulation defined a particular social group, groups based
primarily on the characteristic of age or youth failed.2 95 Courts that found
that neither youth nor age were sufficient characteristics to establish a
particular social group did so for two primary reasons: first, on the basis that
age is not immutable, and second, because "youth" as a particular social
group is too broad of a category.
1. Age and Immutability
The circuit courts have split on whether age is an immutable characteristic.
The Third Circuit held in Lukwago v. Ashcroft that age was not an immutable
characteristic because youth is not innate and because age plays a lesser role
in personal identity over time.29 6 The Third Circuit affirmed this finding in
Escobar v. Gonzales.297 The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion,
holding that "[a]s a category, tattooed youth do not share an innate character-
istic .... ,,298 However, the Seventh Circuit has reached the opposite conclu-
sion, finding that age is an immutable characteristic.2 99 In Cece v. Holder, the
Seventh Circuit held that "young Albanian women who live alone" qualify as
a social group because "[n]either their age, gender, nationality, or living
situation are alterable."30 0
292. Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Three sister circuits
[the Second, Sixth and Seventh] have now vindicated a principle that is surely a matter of common
sense: a child's reaction to injuries to his family is different from an adult's.").
293. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2014).
294. See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Possession of broadly-based
characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with membership in a
particular group.").
295. Id.; Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 E3d 157, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2003)("[U]nlike innate characteris-
tics, such as sex or color, age changes over time, possibly lessening its role in personal identity.
Moreover, children as a class represent an extremely large and diverse group[.]"); Castellano v.
Chacon v. INS, 341 E3d 533 (6th Cir. 2003)("Tattooed youth is overbroad and cannot be seen as
constituting a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who share a 'common,
immutable characteristic."'); Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[Petitioner's]
status as a 'young urban male' is not specific enough for political asylum.").
296. Lukwago, 329 E3d at 171.
297. Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 E3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Nor is youth alone a sufficient
permanent characteristic, disappearing as it does with age.").
298. Castellano Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir. 2003).
299. Cece v. Holder, 733 E3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013).
300. Id. at 673.
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In contrast to some of the circuit courts, the BIA has acknowledged that
age is immutable in certain circumstances. In Matter of Kasinga, the BIA
found that being a "young women" was an integral part of the applicant's
social group and something that she could not change at the time.30 1 In
Matter of S-E-G, a gang-based case, the BIA again noted that the "mutability
of age" cannot be under one's control and may serve as the basis for a
cognizable claim.30 2
Finding that age may be immutable and thus may support a claim for
asylum is consistent with both Acosta and with the UNHCR Guidelines on
Child Asylum Claims.30 3 The UNHCR Guidelines advise that with respect to
a social group determination, while age changes over time, being a child is
immutable at any given point in time.30 4 Furthermore, being a child is
relevant to the identity of the child and to the social visibility of the child in
society.305 The BIAs and UNHCR's positions on age are important, because
establishing the immutability of age is essential to developing a cognizable
particular social group for children fleeing forced recruitment.
2. Children as a Particular Social Group: Too Broad
Even though the BIA and the Seventh Circuit have found that age is
immutable, claims based primarily on the characteristic of age have still
failed for being too broad, even under the Acosta standard. In Lukwago v.
Ashcroft, the Third Circuit held that youth as a defining characteristic was too
broad to form the basis of a particular social group.30 6 The Third Circuit
noted that "children as a class represent an extremely large and diverse
group, and children, even within a single neighborhood, have a wide degree
of varying experiences, interests, and traits.30 7 The Third Circuit reaffirmed
this analysis in Escobar v. Gonzales.3 °8
301. Matter of Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996) (finding that "young women of
the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe who had not had [female genital mutilation], as practiced by that tribe,
and who oppose the practice" were a particular social group.).
302. Matter of S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 583-84 (B.I.A. 2008) ("[If an individual has been
persecuted in the past on account of an age-described particular social group, or faces such
persecution at a time when that individual's age places him within the group, claim for asylum may
still be cognizable.") (emphasis added).
303. UNHCR, Guidelines On International Protection: Child Asylum Claims under Articles
1 (A)2 and 1 (F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 49,
U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/09/08 (Dec. 22, 2009).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2003) (In this case, the proposed group
was "children from Northern Uganda who are abducted and enslaved by the LRA and oppose their
involuntary servitude").
307. Id. at 171-72.
308. Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that one of the reasons
"Honduran street children" were not a particular social group was because youth is "far too vague and
all encompassing.").
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Other circuits, including the Second30 9 and the Sixth,310 have reached
similar conclusions, and the Fifth Circuit has rejected social groups defined
wholly or partly by youth. 3 1  Thus, unless there is a significant additional
limiting factor beyond age, for example, a child with a disability,3 12 an
abandoned street child, 3 13 a child in a particular family,3 14 a female child
living alone,31 5 a female child of a particular clan,3 16 or a female child of a
particular tribe with certain physical characteristics3 17 simply sharing the
characteristic of being a child has never been enough to establish a particular
social group under U.S. asylum law. Therefore, in cases regarding the forced
recruitment of children, proposed social groups must consist of characteris-
tics that are more limiting than simply being a child in order to be cognizable.
B. Children Targeted for Forced Recruitment as a Particular Social
Group
The type of harm that children face when targeted for forcible recruitment
by armed forces or gangs easily rises to the level of persecution.31 8 The
methods used for forcible recruitment often constitute persecution, as does
the treatment children face after being recruited.31 9 However, these children
must also demonstrate that they were targeted for persecution because of a
protected characteristic.3 20 Many groups target children for forced recruit-
ment primarily because they are children.321 However, as previously dis-
cussed, simply sharing the characteristic of being a child is not enough to
309. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a "broadly-based characteris-
tic ... such as youth" cannot be the basis for a particular social group).
310. Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 548 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that the group
"tattooed youth" is too broad).
311. See Serat-Ajanal v. Gonzalez, 207 Fed. Appx. 468 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that gender,
nationality and age are too general to be considered a particular social group); Perez-Molina v.
Gonzales, 193 Fed. Appx 313 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that "characteristics of youth, nationality, and
gender" are overbroad).
312. Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005).
313. Matter of B-F-O-, No. 78-677-043, 24 Imm. Rpt. B1-41 (B.I.A. Nov. 6,2001).
314. Jie Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2004) (family may constitute a PSG; applicant
was a fourteen year old child).
315. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 673 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that "young Albanian women who
live alone" is a particular social group).
316. Mohammed v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that "young girls of the
Benadiri clan" in a particular social group.).
317. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996) (finding that "young women of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe who had not had [female genital mutilation], as practiced by that tribe, and
who oppose the practice" were a particular social group).
318. See, e.g., Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003). Forced conscription by rebel
groups has been found to constitute persecution. Cifuentes-Villatoro v. Ashcroft, 71 Fed. App'x 750,
752 (9th Cir. 2003).
319. See supra Section III (Forced recruitment can include threats, violent abduction, and the
murder of families and friends. Treatment after being forcibly recruited can include beatings, forced
use of drugs and alcohol, and sexual assault.).
320. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2014).
321. See supra Section III.
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constitute a particular social group in U.S. asylum law. 322
Under the Acosta standard, the law was greatly underdeveloped in regards
to children fleeing forced recruitment. Nevertheless, there was opportunity
under Acosta for children fleeing forced recruitment to develop successful
social group claims. However, as a result of the BIA's new "social distinc-
tion" and "particularity" requirements, the BIA and the courts have been
unwilling to find that a particular social group exists in most cases involving
forced recruitment by gangs, even if the child's particular social group is
limited by some other factor, such as geography or resistance to the gang.
This trend, found throughout gang-based asylum claims, will also negatively
impact the likelihood of success for child soldier claims.
1. Children Targeted for Forced Recruitment under the Acosta Standard:
Underdeveloped Case Law
Under the Acosta standard, case law regarding whether children fleeing
forced recruitment could be members of a particular social group was sparse
and still developing. Nevertheless, Acosta is the standard that should be used
to evaluate particular social group claims. Under Acosta, some children
fleeing forced recruitment could have been able to establish that they were
members of a particular social group.
Very few children fleeing forced recruitment as child soldiers make it to
the United States to apply for asylum.323 As a result, there is almost no case
law that looks specifically at whether or not children who are targeted for
recruitment as child soldiers can establish that they are members of a
particular social group, with the exception of a single Third Circuit case,
Lukwago v. Ashcroft.32
Bernard Lukwago was born in Northern Uganda, and when he was fifteen
years old, the Lord's Resistance Army, a rebel group, kidnapped Lukwago
from his village and forced him to become a child soldier.325 Lukwago
asserted that he was a member of a particular social group "of children from
Northern Uganda who are abducted and enslaved by the [Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA)] and oppose their involuntary servitude.32 6 The Third Circuit
held that this was not a cognizable social group for establishing asylum.
327
322. See supra Section IV.A.
323. See Rossi, supra note 31, at 405; see also Bernstein, supra note 196; Brief for Human Rights
First et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 28, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
324. Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003).
325. Id. at 164 (The rebels shot Lukwago's parents when they abducted him and took him to an
LRA camp, where they forced him to perform manual labor. The rebels also forced Lukwago to fight
with them on the front line against the Ugandan government, and forced him to help kill his friend
Joseph who was too weak to continue working. Rebel leaders threatened and beat Lukwago if he did
not perform well and threatened to kill Lukwago if he tried to escape.).
326. Id. at 171.
327. Id. at 173.
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While in agreement that Lukwago was persecuted by the LRA,328 the Third
Circuit held that a social group must "exist independently of the persecution
suffered by the applicant for asylum," and must "have existed before the
persecution.,329 The Court also found that a social group defined primarily
by age failed because of the mutability of age,330 and because "children" as a
group was too large.331 However, the court failed to analyze whether
"children from Northern Uganda" as a particular social group was too broad.
Unlike cases involving the forced recruitment of child soldiers, there is a
wealth of case law on gang recruitment. However, prior to Matter of C-A-,
there were almost no published cases from either the BIA or circuit courts
decided under the Acosta standard that specifically addressed whether
children targeted for gang recruitment were a particular social group. Most of
the published gang-based cases prior to Matter of C-A- were decided on other
issues.332 Other than unpublished decisions by immigration judges,3 33 only
the Third Circuit has published a decision considering the cognizability of a
particular social group in the context of gang recruitment cases under the
Acosta standard.334 In Escobar v. Gonzales, the Third Circuit considered
whether "Honduran Street children" subject to abusive recruitment tactics
from gangs constituted a particular social group.3 35 The court held that
Escobar's social group was comprised of the characteristics of "poverty,
homelessness, and youth," but that those characteristics were "far
too vague and all encompassing to be characteristics that set the perimeters
328. Id. at 170.
329. Id. at 172.
330. Id. at 171 ("However, unlike innate characteristics, such as sex or color, age changes over
time, possibly lessening its role in personal identity.").
331. Id. at 171-72. ("Moreover, children as a class represent an extremely large and di-
verse group[.]") The Third Circuit held that while there is evidence that the LRA targets children,
"there was also evidence in the record that the LRA indiscriminately persecutes civilians regardless
of age." Id. at 172.
332. See, e.g., Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft 383 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2004) (recognizing family as a
particular social group, but finding no nexus); Lopez-Monterroso v. Gonzales, 236 Fed. App'x 207
(7th Cir. 2007) (finding no persecution); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2003)
(considering the case of a former gang member, as compared to children targeted for recruitment but
not yet members and finding that the group "tattooed youth" is too broad).
333. For an analysis of some unpublished Immigration Judge Decisions that made successful
particular social group claims under the Acosta standard, see Boyle, supra note 287; see also
Matthew J. Lister, Gang-Related Asylum Claims: An Overview and Prescription, 38 UMPSLR 827,
830, 835-836, 841 (2008).
334. Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2005). Some circuit courts issued unpublished,
and thus non-precedential, cases on gangs. For example, in Serat-Ajanel v. Gonzales and Perez-
Molina v. Gonzales, the Fifth Circuit found that groups defined as "young Guatemalan males" or
"young Salvadoran males" were not particular social groups. Serat-Ajanel v. Gonzales, 207 Fed.
App'x 468, 469 (5th Cir. 2006) ("The characteristics of youth, nationality, and gender are extremely
general. Such a 'group' lacks the sort of specific characteristics that distinguish and identify a
particular social group."); Perez-Molina v. Gonzales, 193 Fed. App'x 313, 314-15 (5th Cir. 2006)
("The characteristics of youth, nationality, and gender are too generalized and.., lack particularity
and are overbroad.").
335. Escobar, 417 F.3d at 364 (Escobar was a child living on the streets of Honduras, when gangs
began abusing him and pressuring him to join them).
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for a protected group.,
336
The two Third Circuit cases above, as the only published cases on
particular social group claims from children fleeing forced recruitment using
the Acosta standard, demonstrate that the law was particularly underdevel-
oped in this area. However, given the BIA's recognition of the immutability
of age, similar claims might have been successful in other circuits. As will be
discussed further, if a group of children targeted for recruitment as child
soldiers could define themselves with enough specificity to avoid being
overbroad, and without defining themselves by their persecution, such claims
under the Acosta standard could be cognizable.
2. It is Nearly Impossible for Children Targeted for Forced Recruitment to
Meet the New Standard that Includes "Particularity" and
"Social Distinction"
Since Matter of S-E-G- was decided in 2008, there have been no published
cases looking specifically at whether or not children who are targeted for
recruitment as child soldiers can establish that they are members of a
particular social group. However, unlike cases involving the forced recruit-
ment of child soldiers, there is a wealth of case law on forcible gang
recruitment that adopts the requirements of "social distinction" and "particu-
larity., 337 In fact, most case law affirming the current definition of a
particular social group comes from gang-related cases.338 The BIA stated that
there is no "blanket rejection of all factual scenarios involving gangs" and
that "[s]ocial group determinations are made on a case-by-case basis.
However, to date there has not been a single published decision by the BIA or
a circuit court granting asylum in a particular social group claim for a child or
a young person fleeing gang recruitment.3 40
In Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA addressed particular social group member-
ship based on resistance to gang recruitment.341 The respondents in Matter of
336. Id. at 368.
337. See UNHCR GUIDANCE ON GANGS, supra note 15 (noting that "[a]s organized gangs have
become increasingly common in various parts of the world, asylum claims connected with their
activities have multiplied in regions as far apart as Europe and Central America. During recent years,
an increasing number of claims have been made especially in Canada, Mexico, and the United States
of America, notably by young people from Central America who fear persecution at the hands of
violent gangs in their countries of origin.").
338. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Corsetti, Marked for Death: The Maras of Central America and those
who Flee their Wrath, 20 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 407, 418 (2006) ("[T]he immigration courts have been
reluctant to extend the 'membership in a particular social group' category and, for that matter, the
'political opinion' and 'religion' categories, to include gang-based asylum claims"); Uchimiya, supra
note 195, at 139-45 (giving examples of various gang-related cases in which courts have ruled that a
gang is not a 'particular social group' for purposes of asylum and withholding of removal).
339. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. 227, 251 (B.I.A. 2014).
340. See Jacqueline Bhabha & Susan Schmidt, From Kafka to Wilberforce: Is the U.S. Govern-
ment'sApproach to Child Migrants Improving?, 11-02 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 11 n.66 (2011); see also
Boyle, supra note 287, at 1.
341. Matter of S-E-G, 24 1. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008).
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S-E-G- were a young Salvadoran woman and her two younger brothers who
fled El Salvador in 2004 because of violence by the MS-13 gang.34 2 MS-13
members threatened and beat the brothers for refusing to join their gang, and
threatened to rape their sister.343
The siblings argued that the gangs persecuted them on account of their
membership in particular social groups, including "Salvadoran youth who
have been subjected to recruitment efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected
or resisted membership in the gang based on their own personal, moral, and
religious opposition to the gang values and activities," as well as their family
members.3 44 The BIA held that the particular social group proposed by
respondents failed both the "particularity" and "social visibility" require-
ments.3 45 Thus, even though the particular social group was much more
limited than age, or even age and geography, the BIA used the new
requirements to deny the proposed group.
Most of the circuit courts (the First,34 6 Second,34 7 Fourth,34 8 Fifth,3 49
Eighth,350 Ninth,351 and Eleventh352 Circuits) have explicitly or implicitly
342. Id.
343. Id. at 580 (MS-13 members warned the brothers that hey must join the gang or their bodies
would end up in a dumpster. A few months before leaving El Salvador, the siblings learned that
MS- 13 gang members had shot and killed a young boy in their neighborhood after he refused to join
the gang).
344. Id. at 581 (The Immigration Judge denied the claim on multiple grounds, including the lack
of the required nexus to a protected class).
345. Id. at 585, 588 (noting that the proposed social groups "make up a potentially large and
diffuse segment of society" and that " it is difficult to conclude that [the proposed groups] as actually
perceived by the criminal gangs, is much narrower than the general population of El Salvador.").
346. Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that the proposed social
group of "young women recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment" lacked social
visibility and particularity); see also Perez Socop v. Holder, 407 Fed. App'x 495, 498 (1st Cir. 2011).
347. Fuentes-Hernandez v. Holder, 411 Fed. App'x 438, 439 (2d Cir. 2011) (rejecting the
proposed social group of "individuals who resisted gang recruitment in El Salvador."); see also
Lemus-Lemus v. Holder, 343 Fed. App'x 643, 644 (2d Cir. 2009).
348. Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 446-47 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that a group of "young,
Americanized, well-off, Salvadoran male deportees with criminal histories who oppose gangs" was
not a particular social group because it did not satisfy the requirements of immutability, social
visibility, and particularity).
349. Galdamez v. Holder, 556 Fed. App'x 348, 519 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that Galdamez failed
to demonstrate that members of his proposed group of "young men who defy forced recruitment by
the gangs in El Salvador" share a characteristic that gives them social visibility or that the group can
be "defined with sufficient particularity to delimit its membership").
350. Gaitan-Gamez v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 681-82 (8th Cir. 2012) (Reasoning that it could not
"find that the social visibility and particularity requirements articulated in Matter of S-E-G- are
arbitrary or capricious," the Court held that the proposed social group of "young males from El
Salvador who have been subjected to recruitment by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted
membership in the gang based on personal opposition to the gang" was not a particular social group);
see also Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2011); Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder, 662 F.3d 481 (8th
Cir. 2011).
351. Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 860 (9th Cir. 2010) (expressly deferring to the BIA's
"reasonable interpretation" that the proposed group of "young Salvadoran men who have been
recruited by gangs, but refuse to join" do not constitute a particular social group).
352. Turcios-Avila v. U.S. Attorney General, 362 Fed. App'x 37, 40 (lth Cir. 2010) (rejecting
the proposed particular social group of "young men sought for gang recruitment" for lack of
particularity, social visibility, and an immutable characteristic such as "sex, color, or kinship ties").
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accorded Chevron deference to the BIAs reformulation of the requirements
of a particular social group in gang-based cases. These circuits have all
issued decisions finding that individuals targeted for recruitment by gangs in
El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are not part of a particular social
group. None of the circuits granting deference to the BIAs new requirements
had previously published decisions considering whether children forcibly
recruited by gangs could be a particular social group under the Acosta
standard; however, they all found that the new requirements necessitated
denials of the proposed particular social groups.
Not all of the circuit courts have agreed unconditionally with the BIAs
reasoning in gang-related resistance cases. The Tenth Circuit in Rivera-
Barrientos v. Holder found that the proposed social group of "women in El
Salvador between the ages of 12 and 25 who resisted gang recruitment" was
sufficiently particular to be a social group.35 3 However, the Tenth Circuit
rejected the group for lack of social visibility,35 4 indicating that under Acosta,
the claim might have been found meritorious.35 5
The Third Circuit, the only court to publish decisions rejecting children
fleeing forced recruitment as particular social groups under the Acosta
standard,35 6 appears to be reconsidering its stance on what constitutes a
particular social group. In Valdiviezo-Galdamez, the Third Circuit expressly
rejected the new requirements of particularity and social distinction.35 7 In
addition, the Third Circuit reasoned that resistance to gang recruitment could
be the basis for a particular social group using the Acosta standards, and
remanded the case to the BIA for reconsideration in light of Acosta.35 8
3. Acosta Is the Standard That Should Be Used to Evaluate Forced
Recruitment Claims
According to the BIA in Acosta, the determination of what constitutes a
particular social group is a determination that must be made on a case-by-
case basis.359 Under Acosta, the proposed social groups must not be overly
broad and must be based on characteristics that are immutable.360 In addition,
a particular social group cannot be defined by the persecution feared by the
353. Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 650 (10th Cir. 2012).
354. Id. at 653 (The Court reasoned that although particularity and social visibility were not part
of the UNHCR Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group, the BIA's interpretation of a
"particular social group" was not unreasonable and thus, Chevron deference was proper.).
355. See also Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 991-92 (10th Cir. 2015) (El Salvadorans
who had been threatened and actively recruited by gangs, who resisted joining because they opposed
gangs, did not constitute a particular social group because it was not "socially distinct.").
356. Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003); Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363 (3d
Cir. 2005).
357. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. U.S. Attorney General, 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011).
358. Id. at 608-09. See Matter ofM-E-V-G, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014).
359. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
360. Id.
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applicant.361 There is no all-encompassing definition of a particular social
group that would cover all children fleeing forced recruitment. Rather,
individual case-by-case formulations of each child's particular social group
must be considered based on the particular circumstances of the child. Under
the Acosta formulation, some children fleeing forced recruitment could have
established that they were members of a particular social group.
First and foremost, children facing forced recruitment share the immutable
characteristic of age. When a characteristic is immutable, it either cannot be
changed or it is so fundamental to a person's identity that that person should
not be required to change it.362 Age is not something that a child can change
short of growing up, and at the time that a child is targeted for forced
recruitment, his age is something over which he has no control.363 The BIA's
recognition that age is immutable and may form the basis for a particular
social group is significant. As only the Third and Sixth Circuits have held that
age is not immutable, under the Acosta standard alone, age-based claims
have the potential to be successful in most circuits, thereby increasing the
likelihood of finding a cognizable social group for children fleeing forced
recruitment.
Regardless of whether age is immutable, a group based on the characteris-
tic of age alone, without additional limiting factors, would be too broad to
constitute a particular social group even under Acosta. However, in cases of
forced recruitment, there are many potential limiting factors that can be
combined with age to define a cognizable particular social group under the
Acosta standard. One such factor is geography: armed groups often target
children if they live in areas controlled by the armed groups.364 Depending
on the child, the location of their home may be an immutable characteristic. A
child may not have the ability to move due to infancy, poverty, or even
because of how widespread the force is that is trying to recruit him.
Armed forces also target children based on their gender, another immu-
table characteristic. Some children are separated from their families, either
because they are orphans, street children, or for other reasons, and conse-
quently such children are especially vulnerable to recruitment. Such separa-
tion may also be immutable, depending upon the individual case. In countries
where the government is unwilling or unable to protect the child from forced
recruitment, that lack of protection may also be a limiting characteristic. For
children that have resisted gang recruitment, that resistance, especially if
361. Lukwago, 329 F.3d 157; see also UNHCR, Guidelines on Membership of a Particular
Social Group, supra note 75, at para. 11.
362. Matter ofAcosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233-34.
363. See supra Section IV.A.1.
364. See Margaret McCallin, Understanding the Psychosocial Needs of Refugee Children and
Adolescents, 98, available at http://www.forcedmigration.org/rfgexp/pdfs/i-5.pdf; see also Facts
about Child Soldiers, supra note 200 ("Children are most likely to become child soldiers if they are
poor, separated from their families, displaced from their homes, living in a combat zone[,] or have
limited access to education.").
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based upon conscience, might also be a fundamental characteristic. Thus,
there are many possible formulations of a cognizable particular social group
under Acosta that children targeted for forced recruitment could develop
based on their individual circumstances.
In contrast, under the new requirements of "particularity" and "social
visibility," claims from children fleeing forced recruitment have been predomi-
nantly unsuccessful, irrespective of whether the proposed social groups for
these children have been defined by additional limiting characteristics. It is
regrettable that the most recent case in which the BIA affirmed the immutabil-
ity of age, Matter of S-E-G-, was also the case that introduced the new
requirements.365 As a result of the new requirements, the United States is
precluding children that may otherwise have legitimate asylum claims from
obtaining protection.
C. Former Child Soldiers or Former Gang Members Recognized as
Particular Social Groups in Some Circuits
A discussion of children fleeing forced recruitment would not be complete
without looking at those children who were not able to escape their home
countries until after becoming a child solider or gang member. Former child
soldiers or gang members have a greater chance of receiving protection in the
United States than those children who escape before being forcibly recruited.
Although the BIA has not recognized former child soldiers or former gang
members as particular social groups, several circuit courts have done so, even
in light of the new "particularity" and "social distinction" requirements.
The BIA has not considered the issue of whether former child soldiers can
be members of a particular social group. Prior to the imposition of the
requirements of "particularity" and "social distinction," the Third Circuit in
Lukwago v. Ashcroft considered whether former child soldiers could be a
particular social group. The Third Circuit distinguished between social
groups in past persecution claims and those in future persecution claims,
holding that the characteristic of being a former child soldier could be the
basis for a particular social group claim for the purposes of establishing a
well-founded fear of future persecution.36 6 While the court in Lukwago
addressed this important threshold issue and established that former child
soldiers could constitute a particular social group, no other circuits have
considered this question vis-a-vis child soldiers.
In contrast, the BIA has vehemently declined to find that former gang
members constitute a particular social group on that grounds that groups with
365. Matter of S-E-G, 24 1. & N. Dec. 579.
366. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 174. The Third Circuit referenced the Acosta standard in its decision
stating that "membership in the group of former child soldiers who have escaped LRA captivity fits
precisely within the BIA's own recognition that a shared past experience may be enough to link
members of a 'particular social group."' Id. at 178.
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a shared criminal past or criminal activity cannot be recognized as particular
social groups.36 7 The BIA has stated that to do so would have public policy
implications.368 However, the BIA has also used the requirements of "social
distinction" and "particularity" to deny claims from former gang members.3 69
Several circuits, including the Ninth Circuit
370 and the First Circuit371
agree with the BIA that former gang members cannot be a particular social
group. However, other circuits have taken a decidedly different stance on
whether former gang members or child soldiers are a particular social group,
even after the BIA imposed the "particularity" and "social distinction"
requirements. In Ramos v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit held that being a
former gang member is an immutable characteristic within the sense of
372 AthtfrAcosta, and that former gang members constitute a particular and socially
distinct group.373 The Sixth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in recognizing
that former gang members can be a part of a particular social group in
Urbina-Mejia v. Holder. 4 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that mistreatment
based on "being a former member of a group" is mistreatment on account of a
particular social group.
375
367. Matter of E-A-G, 24 1. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2008) (The BIA held that "young persons who
are perceived to be affiliated with gangs" cannot be members of a particular social group because
recognizing gangs as particular social groups would be "inconsistent with the principles underlying
the bars to asylum and withholding of removal based on criminal behavior.").
368. Id. at 596.
369. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 221-22 (B.I.A. 2014) (The BIA held that a group
defined as "former members of the Mara [MS] 18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their gang
membership" does not constitute a particular social group because "it is too diffuse, as well as being
too broad and subjective." The BIA also held that the respondent failed to provide sufficient evidence
that the proposed particular social group was "socially distinct.").
370. Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2007) (The Ninth Circuit rejected a
social group of former gang members because the shared past experience included violent criminal
acts, holding: "Arteaga's shared past experience includes violent criminal activity. We cannot
conclude that Congress, in offering refugee protection for individuals facing potential persecution
through social group status, intended to include violent street gangs who assault people and who
traffic in drugs and commit theft.").
371. Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 85-87 (1st Cir. 2013) (The First Circuit held that former
gang members are not a particular social group, noting that "Congress did not mean to grant asylum to
those whose association with a criminal syndicate has caused them to run into danger.").
372. Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 429 (7th Cir. 2009) (The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
"[b]eing a member of a gang is not a characteristic that a person 'cannot change, or should not be
required to change,' provided that he can resign without facing persecution for doing so .... But if
he can't resign, his situation is the same as that of a former gang member who faces persecution for
having quit .... ) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
373. Id. at 431. (The Seventh Circuit also addressed "particularity" and concluded that "Ramos
was a member of a specific, well-recognized, indeed notorious gang, the former members of which do
not constitute a 'category ... far too unspecific and amorphous to be called a social group."'). The
Court reaffirmed its finding in Gatimi v. Holder, finding that "social visibility" is irrelevant for the
determination of the existence of a particular social group. 578 F.3d 611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009).
374. Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2010). The Sixth Circuit found that both the
Immigration Judge and the BIA had erred when holding that "former gang members" were not part of
a "particular social group." Id. at 367.
375. Id. at 366 (citing to Velasquez-Velasquez v. INS, 53 F. App'x 359, 364 (6th Cir. 2002) (hold-
ing that being a former soldier constituted an immutable characteristic)).
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The latest circuit to hold that former gang members may constitute a
particular social group was the Fourth Circuit in Martinez v. Holder.37 6 The
Fourth Circuit held that the "proposed particular social group of former
MS-13 members from El Salvador is immutable... in that the only way that
Martinez could change his membership in the group would be to rejoin
MS-13. 3 77 Accordingly, the Court held that the BIA erred when it declined
to recognize the particular social group of former members of MS-13 on
immutability grounds.37 8
While recognizing that former gang members or former child soldiers may
constitute a particular social group for the purpose of establishing a well-
founded fear of future persecution is an important step in some circuits, it is
not enough. It does not help the child seeking to avoid the horrors of forced
recruitment in the first place.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In response to a growing number of gang-based claims, the BIA has so
narrowly defined a particular social group that it is all but impossible for
children at risk of being targeted for forced recruitment by either criminal
gangs or armed forces to qualify for asylum. By limiting the definition of a
particular social group, children fleeing forced recruitment are, in most cases,
unable to demonstrate that they are members of particular social group
targeted for persecution. This limitation affects not only children fleeing
gangs, but also other groups of children fleeing forced recruitment that
otherwise engender worldwide sympathy and support, such as child soldiers.
There are significant efforts being made to find forms of immigration
protection for child soldiers beyond just asylum, including a special visa for
child soldiers.3 79 While this would certainly benefit child soldiers and
provide a way around the social group definition, such efforts would do little
to help children fleeing forced recruitment by gangs in Central America.
Given the recent public reaction to the surge of children from Central
America, it is unlikely that the political will exists to create such a visa track
that could encompass Central American children as well.380 Furthermore, it
is unlikely that any special visa track would be comprehensive enough to
376. Martinez v. Holder, No. 12-2424, 2014 WL 243293 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2014).
377. Id. at 906.
378. Id. at 912-13 (The Fourth Circuit also looked at the issue of whether the groups whose
members had formerly participated in criminal conduct could be disqualified as particular social
groups. The court found this to be "untenable as a matter of statutory interpretation and logic,"
pointing out that only some criminal activity acts as a bar to asylum.).
379. In 2007 during a Congressional hearing, Senator Tom Coburn proposed a special track or
visa for child soldiers seeking asylum. Casualties of War: Child soldiers and the Law: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law on the S. Comm on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 23
(2007) (statement of Sen. Tom Coburn).
380. Rossi, supra note 31, at 422-35.
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ensure that all children fleeing forced recruitment obtain the protection they
deserve.
Unfortunately, the BIAs new requirements of "particularity" and "social
distinction" leave little room to develop successful social group claims for
children escaping forced recruitment today. As a result, their advocates must
rely on creative strategies when presenting asylum claims in the United
States.381 These strategies include relying on a protected ground other than a
particular social group, or tailoring the particular social group as narrowly as
possible to survive the particularity and social visibility tests.3 82 There has
been some limited success with these strategies at the immigration judge
level,383 although they have not been successful in a single case published by
the BIA or circuits courts.
It is regrettable that asylum law in the United States has developed in this
way. The Acosta formulation provides a clear yet flexible standard for
determining what constitutes a particular social group, consistent with
international law. There was no need for the additional requirements of
particularity and social visibility, and those additional requirements have
only served to unnecessarily constrain and confuse the particular social group
analysis. U.S. asylum law should return to the Acosta formulation of a
particular social group. In the alternative, the United States could implement
the UNHCR's formulation, in which "particularity" and "social perception"
are an alternative formulation of a particular social group, rather than
additional requirements to the Acosta standard. Either solution would be
consistent with international norms regarding the definition of a particular
social group.
The new requirements of particularity and social visibility are particularly
devastating to asylum claims from children fleeing forced recruitment. Until
asylum laws in the United States are once again consistent with internation-
ally recognized norms, children fleeing forced recruitment from gangs and
armed forces will continue to face an enormous challenge in securing
protection in the United States. By refusing to recognize that children
targeted for recruitment for gang membership or to be child soldiers may
constitute a particular social group, we are telling children who flee their
home countries prior to being abducted, indoctrinated, tortured, and in many
cases forced to perpetrate abuses, that we will not protect them from these
horrors.
381. There are many practice pointers on how to present a forced recruitment claim. See, e.g.,
WOLA, supra note 240; NIJC, Particular Social Group Practice Advisory, supra note 160.
382. See, e.g., WOLA, supra note 240; NIJC, Particular Social Group Practice Advisory, supra
note 160.
383. See WOLA, supra note 240.
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